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The Divine Action Project, 1988–2003*
 
WESLEY J. WILDMAN
 
Abstract
 
This article explores the state of the art in theories of special divine action by means of a
study of the Divine Action Project (DAP) co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center
for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. The basic aim is to introduce the DAP and to
summarize its results, especially as these were compiled in the final “capstone” meeting of the DAP,
and drawing on the published output of the project where possible. The subsidiary aim is to evaluate
criticisms of theories of special divine action developed within the DAP.
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Does God act to achieve special providential aims in the world? Sacred texts of
many traditions speak of intentional divine action. Some people pray expecting
God to respond and answer their prayers. Religious liturgies express confidence in
God’s action in the past as well as God’s ability and willingness to intervene in
response to present concerns. Over the centuries, religious scholars have advanced
theories of divine action in order to give intellectual support to traditional claims
about God’s special, intentional, purposeful action. What is the state of the art in
contemporary theories of special divine action?
On the pessimistic side, the recent book 
 
Divine Action and Modern Science
 
 claims
that contemporary theology is in a crisis.
 
1
 
 Its author, Nicholas Saunders, believes
that Christianity desperately needs a sound theoretical account of God’s action in
the world if it is not to be swept away by demythologized secular worldviews
with no need of the hypothesis of God’s special providential activity. Unfortu-
nately, according to Saunders, no adequate theory of divine action yet exists, and
this state of affairs threatens to be devastating for contemporary Christian
theology, as well as for the faith and practice of Christian believers.
By contrast, far more optimistic conclusions are flowing from what I shall call
the Divine Action Project (DAP). Divine action was the major theme of a wide-
ranging series of conferences and publications on theology and science jointly
sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences in Berkeley.
 
2
 
 This research group culminated its work in a
 
*Look for responses to this article in the October 2004 issue of 
 
Theology and Science
 
.
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September 2003 “capstone conference” in Castel Gandolfo, near Rome, reflecting
on its published output, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement. What I
call the DAP refers to the work of this group as it bears on divine action. DAP
participants have been trying to meet precisely what Saunders rates as Christian
theology’s single most pressing need. The major points of consensus among DAP
participants were that there are significant theoretical grounds for confidence in
the intelligibility of the concept of providential divine action, and that there are
several technically and theologically feasible theories of it.
What could account for these spectacularly divergent conclusions? Is this more
evidence that theology is a “think anything, say anything” discipline, with no
prospects for broad consensus or rational understanding? Alternatively, can we
triangulate the disagreement and explain it? The basic aim of this article is to
introduce the DAP and to summarize its results, especially as these were compiled
in the capstone meeting, and drawing on the published output of the project
where possible. This task consumes the bulk of the article. The subsidiary aim is to
evaluate criticisms of the DAP. I shall not devote space to my own criticisms
beyond what I say in the next paragraph. I shall argue that Saunders does not
provide a compelling argument for his pessimistic conclusions and that his other-
wise insightful criticisms of some DAP theories silently depend on an interpreta-
tion of laws of nature that those he criticizes reject. Furthermore, referring to the
argument of German philosopher Immanuel Kant that it is impossible to demon-
strate freedom in terms of categories of causation, I shall try to diagnose the
peculiar challenges facing the DAP, to analyze how participants handled those
pressures, and to show how Saunders’ criticism fits into this wider pattern. This
attempt to explain the divergence of perspectives hopefully will extend the circle
of consensus as far as possible and clarify the irreducible disagreements that
remain.
I need to lay my cards on the table, particularly since credibility can be an issue
both in summarizing complex projects and in addressing their critics. I have been
involved in the DAP as one of the specialists in theology and science, contributing
to volumes 2, 3, and 4. Unlike most other participants, I hold that the postulate of
intentional divine action exacerbates the problem of theodicy to such a degree that
we are justified in rejecting it for moral and theological reasons. This is the view of
British theologian Maurice Wiles, also.
 
3
 
 Although my view of God differs slightly
from that of Wiles, I do concur with his judgment that the idea of intentional,
discrete divine acts is incredible, no matter how much some strains of Christian
piety and large tracts of the Vedas, the Bible, and the Qur’an take it for granted. I
approach Saunders’ book as a sympathetic and curious reader.
 
4
 
 After all, if the
argument of that book is sound, then (presumably against Saunders’ intentions) I
could venture to add incoherence of the concept of intentional divine action to the
existing charge of moral repugnance. Likewise, though I participated in the DAP
as one finally unconvinced about the reality of intentional divine action because of
the problem of theodicy and the incredibility of discrete divine acts, I am
persuaded that the DAP has succeeded in demonstrating the coherence and tech-
nical feasibility of several theories of intentional divine action. It is fundamentally
the view of God underlying the main proposals emerging from the DAP with
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which I disagree, therefore, rather than the proposed theories of divine action
themselves.
 
Introduction to the Divine Action Project
 
In the late 1980s, Robert Russell of the Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences (CTNS) in Berkeley and George Coyne, S. J. of the Vatican Observatory
(VO), in discussions with Nancey Murphy and William Stoeger, S. J., discerned a
need for research on the topic of God’s action in the world. Rightly noticing that
the question of divine action is one of the theological issues that most directly
presupposes facts about the natural world and its governing laws, they reasoned
that evaluating theories of divine action in relation to our best knowledge of the
natural world was very likely to be fruitful. What would be the fruit of such a
discussion? If it were done well, they supposed, it could produce confirmation or
disconfirmation of certain theories, the development of new proposals for divine
action, and at the very least, a state-of-the-art survey of credible options. Such a
survey might even make clear the theological presuppositions that would lead a
thoughtful religious intellectual to affirm one theory of divine action over another.
These were high hopes so their fulfillment would require a great deal of work and
a well-designed process. Together, CTNS and the VO devised a method for the
discussions. In this way—and the details are more fascinating that this compact
summary can hope to suggest—the DAP was born.
Most people involved in the DAP had been involved in science-religion
dialogues enough to know how perilous any work plan would be. Here is a short
list of challenges with associated implications for the project. First, theologians
typically do not know enough science to do what was proposed so expert
scientists would be needed. Second, scientists typically do not appreciate the
nuances of theology well enough to have much patience for a theologically
focused project so the design would have to involve education of the scientists as
much as education of the theologians. Third, many scientific perspectives are
relevant to divine action and scientists typically are expert in only one area of
science so confusion might reign unless the conferences focus on one area of
science at a time. Fourth, a relatively small core of people would have to be
involved in all conferences to guarantee some continuity of thinking and this small
group would have to be expanded with experts who could cover the specific
theme of each conference adequately. Fifth, divine action is a broad topic and a
focused discussion that can engage the sciences seriously would require the
additional constraint that the target will be divine action in conformity with
natural laws. Sixth, the world religions are so diverse in their views of Ultimate
Reality that a focused discussion would be most likely if the religious thinkers
were limited to experts in Christianity. Seventh, and finally, the phenomenon of
scientists and theologians talking past one another and utterly failing to engage
the issue at hand is unpleasantly common in science and religion dialogue. It
occurs in other interdisciplinary work, also. The method of procedure would have
to involve intense interaction and a commitment on the part of project members to
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engage one another and to do the difficult work of learning new perspectives. It
would also be vital to involve scholars such as Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John
Polkinghorne, Bob Russell, and Bill Stoeger who had professional competence in
both theology and science.
The outcome of these considerations was an intensive workgroup-style method
with some unusual features. The series of conferences was united by the theme
“Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action” and each conference in the series
focused on a specific scientific topic: quantum cosmology and the laws of nature,
chaos and complexity, biological evolution, cognitive neuroscience, and quantum
mechanics. For each conference, the organizing committee asked a new group of
scientists and philosophers expert in the assigned topic to team up with the more
or less unvarying group of philosophically minded theologians. Once the entire
group was identified, the organizing committee distributed a packet of key
readings that everyone in the group was expected to know, thereby establishing a
baseline level of shared knowledge. Once these were digested, a number of “pre-
conferences” were held to discuss the topic in smaller groups and to formulate
ideas for research papers. These pre-conferences were local affairs, usually one
somewhere in Europe and one somewhere in the United States.
Subsequently, those wanting to write a paper produced a draft and submitted it
to the organizers. Here is where the genius of the method becomes evident.
Organizers distributed these drafts to everyone involved in the working group
and expected everyone to make written responses, which were in due course
distributed to everyone. In this way, everyone together was involved in a rich
discussion about the salient issues before the main conference even began. A
second round of papers—some revisions, some new—were written and broadcast,
followed by the second round of responses, once again with everyone reading all
of the responses. Eventually those writing produced a definitive conference draft
of their papers, suitably revised in light of the comments received, and these drafts
were distributed and read in advance of the conference. This intense method of
proceeding optimizes engagement with the issue under discussion and minimizes
the problem of “parallel play” pseudo-dialogue.
At each main conference, where the entire group gathered for the first time,
there was the refreshing policy of not reading any papers. Since all had been
distributed and read prior to the conference, the author merely made a few
introductory remarks, usually bearing on motivation or newly developed ideas,
and then the group launched into vigorous discussion for ninety minutes or so. It
was draining work but also work of the most intellectually rewarding sort. Some
sessions in the conference were given over to relatively unstructured discussion of
the main theme. After each conference, people rewrote their papers in light of the
conference discussion and submitted the final draft to the editors of the conference
volume. If the paper was accepted for publication in the volume, then the editorial
suggestions were incorporated in yet one more round of revisions. The whole
process, from beginning to end, took at least two years for each volume.
Nothing less than this intense working style can ever really come to grips
with the complexity of a problem with such obvious interdisciplinary dimen-
sions. This conference series was one of only two I have been involved in that
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produced a cautious yet real sense of making progress on a research topic.
 
5
 
There are many sorts of conferences, of course, and not all have a research
agenda. Time after time, however, conferences with a research agenda under-
estimate the difficulty of the task or attempt to spare participants from investing
a lot of energy in the project, with the result that no progress is made. It is to
the credit of the DAP organizers that they designed a procedure capable of
supporting their research agenda.
Within the core group, the organizers included at various times process theolo-
gians (Ian Barbour, Charles Birch, Jack Haught), more-or-less Neoplatonists (Janet
Soskice, Keith Ward, and myself), and more-or-less Thomists (George Coyne,
Denis Edwards, Stephen Happel, Michael Heller, Bill Stoeger) of various stripes to
challenge and complicate the dominant view of more-or-less personalist theism
and panentheism (Bill Alston, Philip Clayton, George Ellis, Philip Hefner, Jürgen
Moltmann, Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke, Ted Peters, John Polkinghorne, Bob
Russell, Tom Tracy). This complication arises mostly from within the sphere of
advocacy of intentional divine action. However, the organizers also included
philosophers and theologians who do not advocate intentional divine action, such
as Willem Drees and myself, to challenge the project’s overall coherence. Of
course, this list of names does not include the many historians of science, philoso-
phers of science, and scientists who were involved at one time or another or the
new theologians and philosophers present at the capstone conference.
 
6
 
Other methodological decisions were equally important for success. The
organizers framed the project within the science-religion dialogue to make the
discussion more precise and to fulfill the conditions for detecting and under-
standing divergence among the views of participants. They conceived of a tech-
nical readership for the DAP volumes, thereby rejecting any tendencies toward
oversimplification. They concentrated on tractable issues rather than spectacular
ones, which temporarily de-emphasizes traditional Christian themes such as the
resurrection or miracles for the sake of allowing the project to move forward
efficiently in other areas. They encouraged parallel research agendas within the
one overall project, as we shall see later. They steered away from practical ethics to
avoid direct discussion of divisive moral questions that might diffuse the focus of
research. In addition, as noted above, they kept the theological focus on Chris-
tianity so as not to complicate the project with an interreligious dialogue agenda,
and they focused mainly on personalist theism and panentheism, because it is
with these ideas of God that traction with the natural sciences is strongest. Each of
these organizing decisions limited the project and it is not difficult to imagine
(indeed, I have heard) complaints about these limitations. I think the decisions
made were good ones because without the precious commodities of focus and
efficiency, no advance would be possible.
The fruit of these labors was of several kinds. The DAP succeeded in stabilizing
terminology that is key for understanding theories of divine action. It demon-
strated the usefulness of certain strategies for inquiry. It generated a comprehen-
sive classification of alternative theories of divine action. It diagnosed the way that
theological and philosophical instincts and convictions affect debates over divine
action, and it generated a number of credible theories of intentional divine action.
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Stated quickly like this, this list of accomplishments may seem rather modest.
As I hope the details will show, however, these are remarkable achievements in a
theological climate marked by stormy disagreements over everything from legiti-
mate strategies to acceptable conclusions. In what follows, I shall outline the most
relevant and important details of these conclusions, drawing especially on discus-
sions and papers from the capstone conference.
 
Results: stabilizing terminology for discussion
 
Whenever a group of scholars can agree on terminological distinctions, they
greatly improve the chances of advancing their research project and under-
standing disagreements among themselves. Sadly, this degree of clarity and
terminological consensus is rare within theology and the humanities. I take these
relatively stable distinctions also to be of great significance for the wider debate
over divine action. I will refer to them freely in what follows, so I lay them out
here. Grasping these distinctions is the most efficient way both to get into the
mindset of DAP participants and to frame the state-of-the-art options within the
contemporary discussion of divine action in the science-religion dialogue
context.
One crucial issue affecting many terminological distinctions is the status of
language about divine action. How literally can we treat the theological termi-
nology we use? If we accept the traditional assumption that all language about
God is analogical or metaphorical, then how can we render terms such as “divine
act” or “divine intention” in the precise ways needed to make sense of the debates
over feasibility of theoretical proposals for SDA? It does seem clear that the DAP
and theologians more generally treat language about God as having degrees of
literalness, so that we can judge certain metaphorical or analogical statements to
be closer to the truth of the matter, and others to be further from the mark. The
issue of degrees of literalness of theological language, however, continues to be a
difficult problem within theology. This is due fundamentally to the instability of
any standard we might invoke to assess literalness or accuracy of conceptual
formulation. If we wish to speak literally about God forming intentions to act, for
example, the theological schema that makes sense of divine intentions will be
subject to questions about literalness.
 
7
 
 These questions in turn call for a metaphys-
ical vision that is capable of stabilizing a theological schema of the divine nature.
Now our metaphysical theory is setting conditions on what can count as a viable
portrayal of God, whereas arguably it should be the other way around. The
resulting choice seems to be between vicious regress and vicious circularity. The
specter of theologians vainly fumbling after stable theological terminology has
stirred mystical theologians (among whom I count myself) for centuries. It has also
been one inspiration for the aggressive attacks on the so-called ontotheological
tradition in recent decades. However, if we turn to poetic indirection instead of
metaphysics, we face other problems, including the fact that poetic play is itself
parasitic upon already existing terminology and symbols, which liturgical prac-
tices and metaphysical theology stabilize. Several DAP participants urged greater
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consciousness of such problems upon the group,
 
8
 
 though discussions seemed to
proceed without satisfying resolutions. For now, we must simply assume that we
can speak with “some degree” of literalness about features of the divine nature
needed to make sense of the terms of the debate over divine action. With that in
mind, we turn to the key terminological distinctions.
First, the DAP concluded that the distinction between general and special divine
action is important but that theologians draw it differently depending on their
particular interests. This occurs because there is considerable entanglement of the
general and the special in such concepts as continuous creation, divine sustaining
of reality, and ubiquitous intentional divine action. Thus, we must stabilize these
terms by stipulation, and this causes no confusion providing that we are clear
about which way of distinguishing the terms we are using. One common path not
taken here is to say that general divine action refers to the act of creation itself
together with divine acts that occur at every place and time within created reality,
whereas special divine action refers to acts that have effects in some places and
times but not others. This way of drawing the distinction is useful for keeping the
focus on one-time, one-place special divine acts but does not easily comprehend a
number of views affirming universal special divine action (most clearly
Murphy’s). It also obscures relevant questions about the divine nature. For the
purposes of this paper, therefore, I will draw the distinction differently, in terms of
presuppositions about God’s character, as follows:
1. General divine action (GDA) is the creation and sustaining of all reality in so
far as this does not necessarily presume any specific providential divine inten-
tions or purposes.
 
9
 
2. Special divine action (SDA) is specific providential acts, envisaged, intended,
and somehow brought about in this world by God, possibly at particular times
and places but possibly also at all times and places.
This way of drawing the distinction captures the conclusions of the DAP more
effectively than the alternative.
Second, over the years DAP members became increasingly aware of the variety
of ways in which theological theories can relate to the natural sciences. Russell has
presented a rich view of these relations in an elaborate diagram, which serves to
underline how internally complex each of theology and science are, and thus, how
rich the mutual interaction between them can be in principle.
 
10
 
 Within the DAP,
two kinds of relation proved most important, both of which we called forms of
“traction” between theology and science, a term suggested by Philip Clayton. By
traction we mean formal and informal logical connections that yield both intelligi-
bility and potential for correction and improvement.
1. Traction as consonance envisages theological assertions that are vague enough
to be consistent with several competing scientific theories yet elaborated in
such a way as to register and resonate with large areas of scientific theory.
2. Traction as consistency envisages theological propositions so specific that they
can conflict directly with scientific assertions.
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These two kinds of traction correspond to two kinds of sub-projects within the
DAP that coexisted more-or-less happily, though not always without confusion
and misunderstanding, especially in the early years of the project. The DAP was
strongly committed to maximizing traction in the different ways that each sub-
project demands, because traction increases the credibility of theological
proposals.
Third, the DAP project tried to be sensitive to issues of theological consistency.
For example, the idea of God sustaining nature and its law-like regularities with
one hand while miraculously intervening, abrogating, or ignoring those regulari-
ties with the other hand struck most members as dangerously close to outright
contradiction. Most participants certainly felt that God would not create an
orderly world in which it was impossible for the creator to act without violating
the created structures of order. This widely shared conviction led the main line of
the DAP’s research efforts to seek an account of SDA that was in accord with
created structures of nature, which underlies the following key distinction. A
noninterventionist special divine act is in accord with created structures of order
and regularity within nature, while an interventionist special divine act involves
abrogating, suspending, or ignoring created structures of order and regularity
within nature.
Some DAP participants were content to imagine that SDA is usually noninter-
ventionist but on rare and providentially portentous occasions, such as the resur-
rection of Jesus Christ perhaps, or the consummation of the universe, God could
act in interventionist fashion. Others entertained noninterventionist or “more than
interventionist” readings of such events. For instance, Russell wondered whether
we could interpret the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ not so much as
God violating existing regularities of nature but as God transforming those under-
lying regularities so that a new reality can emerge out of the existing one.
 
11
 
 Still
others such as myself, when entertaining this issue in the (to me) alien terms of
personalist theism, thought the inconsistency of miraculous interventionism a
small thing, and estimated the theological hubris of confining God to noninterven-
tionist action a greater danger. Despite these differences, there was agreement that
accounts of SDA as noninterventionist enjoy the greatest traction with the natural
sciences, in the sense of consistency, because they allow scientific accounts of
natural regularities to constrain what is possible in theological assertions about
SDA.
Fourth, there was consensus among DAP participants that miracles received
insufficient attention in the course of the project. This was due to the theological
interest in noninterventionist theories of SDA and the methodological interest in
maximizing traction between theology and the natural sciences. Nevertheless, we
did discuss the idea of miracle from time to time. Ward offered the richest set of
distinctions among ideas of miracle, as follows:
1. Miracles might be suspension or abrogation of nature’s law-like regularities.
2. Miracles might be ways of speaking of apparently providential events that
strike us as important and surprising.
3. Miracles might be the activation of latent features of natural objects that do not
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show up within the theoretical framework of our existing natural sciences. For
example, theopoiesis (theosis or divinization) might be a natural but latent
feature of human beings that God can activate despite the fact that our science
knows nothing of this possibility, and perhaps never could recognize it.
 
12
 
The first sense of miracle as suspension or abrogation of nature’s law-like
regularities is precisely as clear as the reigning view of those regularities them-
selves (the same is true of the concept of intervention), which in turn directs our
attention to laws of nature, to which we will come in a moment.
Fifth, related to the various interpretations of miracles, the DAP experimented
with several distinctions bearing on the epistemology of situations in which a
divine act is noticed or not noticed as such. The published distinction between
divine acts that are apparent with (or without) religious presuppositions
 
13
 
 finally
proved less compelling than Tracy’s three-fold distinction among special divine
acts as: objectively significant, causally (but not objectively) significant, and
subjectively (but neither objectively nor causally) significant. In the sense of this
distinction, objective special divine actions have a counterfactual logical structure:
if God had not acted then nothing significant would have occurred. Subjective
divine actions have a similarly crisp meaning: they have to do with perceptions
only and presume nothing at all about God. The middle position is trickier but still
needed because of the logical possibility that some events may have special
providential significance even when God does not act specially to cause them. This
providential significance might even be anticipated by God (if a suitable interpre-
tation of divine knowledge is in place) and yet not intentionally caused.
Sixth, the DAP adapted to its own purposes the distinction between compati-
bilism and incompatibilism that has proved useful in the context of philosophical
debates over human freedom in the world. Wegter-McNelly furnished the most
comprehensive view of the potential for this distinction by noticing three variants:
1. Anthropo-physical (in)compatibilism asserts that human freedom is
(in)compatible with physical determinism.
2. Anthropo-theological (in)compatibilism asserts that human freedom is
(in)compatible with divine determinism.
3. Theo-physical (in)compatibilism asserts that divine freedom is (in)compatible
with physical determinism.
Determinism here means that, given that the world is a particular way at one
moment, its unfolding thereafter is fixed and inflexible. In the case that this
inflexibility is due to the laws of nature, we would be speaking of physical
determinism. When it is due to God’s action or God’s will or perhaps even God’s
knowledge, then we would be speaking of divine determinism. Philosophical
writings on determinism are filled with subtleties but this definition will serve my
purposes here.
Each of the three ways of distinguishing between compatibilism and incom-
patibilism has its own characteristic debates and a wealth of literature. The third—
theo-physical—was the main concern of the DAP. In this context, now dropping
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the qualification “theo-physical,” we used the distinction in the following way:
Incompatibilism assumes that physical determinism entails the impossibility of
non-interventionist SDA (equivalent to NISDA 
 
→
 
 ~ PD); and compatibilism
assumes that non-interventionist SDA is consistent with either physical deter-
minism or physical indeterminism (equivalent to NISDA 
 
→
 
 PD or ~ PD).
Incompatibilists adopt the strategy of showing that the physical world is
indeterministic, because this is a necessary condition for non-interventionist
SDA. This leads to strong interest in gaps, especially uncloseable gaps, in the
world’s causal nexus. By contrast, compatibilists have nothing to gain by
demonstrating or assuming physical indeterminism. Because compatibilist
theories of SDA remain untouched by debates over physical determinism, their
proponents have no need to locate uncloseable gaps in the world’s causal nexus.
This strategic difference was evident throughout the DAP. In fact, there is a tight
correlation between these strategies and the types of traction defined above.
Incompatibilist proposals seek traction as consistency, which is to say they
achieve intelligibility by exposing theological propositions about SDA to direct
potential contradiction by physical propositions about the world’s causal nexus
of events. By contrast, compatibilist proposals seek traction as consonance,
which is to say that their theological propositions about SDA are immune from
direct conflict with physical propositions about the world’s causal nexus of
events but can still achieve intelligibility by richly registering the scientific
portrayal of physical reality.
 
14
 
Seventh, the DAP hosted a variety of approaches to developing incompatibilist
theories of SDA (these are the theories that have something to gain by locating
causal openness in physical reality). One strategic disagreement expresses
different appraisals of the near certainty that our current scientific descriptions of
the structures and regularities of nature are only approximations. The disagree-
ment is as follows: an adequate incompatibilist theory of SDA should seek causal
openness in nature not only as described in existing physics but also as intimated
by the incompleteness and provisional character of current science; or, an
adequate incompatibilist theory of SDA should seek causal openness in nature
only as described by existing physics. Theories of SDA following the first
approach (represented especially by Polkinghorne) accept a short-term reduction
in concrete intelligibility by entertaining speculative future physics, in exchange
for greater long-term robustness in the face of anticipated changes in the scientific
portrayal of nature. Theories of SDA following the second approach maximize the
concrete intelligibility of the theological theory in the short term by focusing solely
on existing physics while leaving the theological theory more vulnerable to falsifi-
cation by future changes in science. Thus, this strategic distinction expresses
different ways of balancing two theoretical virtues that are desirable in a theo-
logical theory: short-term concrete intelligibility through dealing only with
existing science and steering away from speculative physics, versus long-term
robustness in the face of ever-changing scientific portrayals of the world’s causal
nexus.
Eighth, the DAP generated a strong consensus around distinctions pertaining to
interpretation of the laws of nature. The basic distinction is between the following:
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1. The laws of nature have descriptive status only; they refer to regularities and
patterns that we discern in natural objects, relationships, events, and processes.
2. The laws of nature have ontological status; they refer to ontologically indepen-
dent principles to which natural objects, relationships, events, and processes
are subject.
There are a number of ways to picture the mode of existence of principles to
which natural objects, relationships, events, and processes are subject on an onto-
logical interpretation of the laws of nature. Such principles may exist indepen-
dently of nature yet be known through the study of nature, they may exist
independently of nature and be rationally intuited without empirical observation,
or they may be vested in nature as deep formal or structural principles. The
distinction here is so framed that we can safely bracket these questions of
ontology. The key point is that exclusively descriptive approaches to the laws of
nature deny that these laws refer to existent principles.
 
15
 
 In the case of stochastic
or probabilistic laws, this second possibility is ambiguous. This leads to a finer,
three-fold distinction for stochastic laws, as follows:
1. Stochastic laws of nature have descriptive status only (as above).
2. Stochastic laws of nature have ontological status in the sense of referring to
principles or deep structures of nature that statistically govern large ensembles
of events but not each individual event within an ensemble of events.
3. Stochastic laws of nature have strong ontological status, in the sense of refer-
ring to principles or deep structures of nature that statistically govern each
individual event within an ensemble of events.
While there are many perspectives on laws of nature in the philosophy of
science literature, the DAP consensus was that the distinctions above capture the
features of those wider debates that are relevant for evaluating theories of SDA.
Some participants argued that the strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic
laws was incoherent, and it is certainly true that no theory of SDA proposed
within the DAP makes use of it. Yet it is important to acknowledge that this view
of stochastic laws exists. In fact, it is one reason
 
16
 
 for the widespread intuition that
quantum-level SDA must be interventionist, violating the probabilities that
constrain quantum measurement events. This view appears in criticisms of
proposals for quantum level SDA both within the DAP and beyond.
Finally, with regard to the divine nature, the DAP predictably found itself
grappling with the perennial question of the distinctions among personalist
theism, classical theism, and panentheism. These words are used in so many ways
that they can only be stabilized by stipulation, and even then, any stipulation begs
a horde of detailed questions. Nevertheless, for the sake of maximizing clarity in
an inevitably murky situation, I present here the working set of distinctions that
guided DAP terminology. First, assume that we can stabilize the distinction
between God as complete without the creation and God as incomplete without the
creation. Further, assume that we can make out a distinction between God being
changed by the world and God remaining unchanged. Then, while these are by no
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means simple assumptions, they do allow for a grid of positions, as shown in
Table 1.
Note that the empty position on the grid has representatives, though not within
the DAP. For example, Robert Neville’s view of 
 
creatio ex nihilo
 
, an intensification
of John Duns Scotus’s stress on the primacy of the divine will over the divine
nature, has “God” determining both the world’s nature and the divine nature in
the primordial creative act. Thus, God has no nature apart from creation and so, in
that sense, is incomplete (in fact, is nothing) without it. Neville belongs in the
empty square, accordingly.
 
17
 
 Note, also, that these distinctions assign a tightly
constrained definition to panentheism. In its more literal sense, it affirms simply
that all of reality is in God, by contrast with pantheism, which literally means that
everything is God. Yet the narrower construal of panentheism introduced here is
not an unusual usage in our time.
 
Results: classification of options
 
The positions advocated within the DAP can be summarized at two levels. First,
taking the widest possible view, we can picture each position within the project, as
well as positions not represented within the project, as making a series of key
decisions that characterize the outcome. We can represent the outcome of analysis
at this level as a decision tree, one version of which is supplied in Appendix A.
This view of matters is helpful for placing the main focus of the project—on
personalist theism and panentheism—in a wider context that is sensitive to issues
of broad concern in comparative theology.
Second, we can tighten the focus onto the major proposals of the DAP and
characterize them using the distinctions introduced above. The result is a different
kind of diagram (Table 2) containing the views that I will discuss in more detail
below. Table 2 also includes several actual or hypothetical critics of the major
views defended within the project—Saunders, Wiles, and Neville—with their
names in parentheses.
The major result of the DAP is simply that all of the views of objective SDA
defended by participants are feasible and coherent in most respects. This is not the
happy agreement it might seem on the surface. A number of participants,
including me, reject the entire concept of SDA as morally intolerable, though not
thereby unintelligible. There are also fierce disagreements about whether com-
patibilist or incompatibilist approaches are more promising, whether individual
 
Table 1
 
Types of Theism
 
God can be changed 
by the world
God remains unchanged 
by the world
 
God is complete 
without the creation
Personalist theism Classical theism
God is incomplete 
without the creation
Panentheism
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Table 2
 
Views of Special Divine Action (SDA)
 
Characteristics of 
Views
 
Non-objective Objective
Compatibilist Incompatibilist
 
Holders of Views
 Davies
Drees
Wildman
(Neville)
(Wiles)
Clayton
Peacocke
Soskice
Stoeger
Ward
Laws of Nature as: Laws of Nature as:
Approximate Descriptive Ontological Strong-ontological
Polkinghorne Murphy
Russell
Ellis
Tracy
(Noone within 
DAP)
(Saunders)
 
Non-interventionist
 
N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
 
Notes
 
These views seek traction with the 
natural sciences through 
consonance and richly registering 
scientific details rather than 
through direct consistency 
constraints
This view is 
effectively 
compatibilist 
but can invite 
causal joint 
proposals
Universal SDA; 
divergence on 
whether God 
plays a 
constitutive 
role in events
SDA occurs 
only in some 
events and God 
plays a 
constitutive role 
in none
Tracy does 
explore this view 
as a thought 
experiment 
(miracles)
This is the view 
that Saunders 
seems to want 
to achieve
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views are framed in the optimal way, and whether a strong-ontological interpreta-
tion of stochastic laws of nature is possible and desirable. Through all of these and
other disagreements, the consensus is that we can give several theologically
feasible and scientifically coherent accounts of God’s action in the world. The
details have proved fascinating, however, so I now turn to a discussion of general
trends and particular positions.
Views on the left side of the diagram enjoy the least traction (in the sense of
direct consistency constraints) with the natural sciences, whereas traction of this
sort increases as we move rightwards through the columns. Indeed, the non-
objective (i.e. merely causally or subjectively significant) views and the com-
patibilist views seek traction of the other sort, as consonance with the natural
sciences. There is an issue of taste or rational style here and it is fair to ask about
why people diverge on such issues. I think two competing theological instincts are
at play and understanding them can illumine the divergent judgments about the
best type of traction to seek.
One instinct is to seek 
 
concrete intelligibility of theological assertions
 
, which drives
theories of divine action toward incompatibilist, non-interventionist approaches,
discourages speculation regarding future science, and encourages theological
speculation to maximize intelligibility-yielding traction between theology and
science. Another instinct is to demonstrate 
 
credibility of basic faith claims
 
, which
drives theories of divine action to seek long-term stability by avoiding over-
commitment to existing science, and to limit theological speculation to the
minimum needed to establish the rational feasibility of faith claims, resisting
further speculation so as to avoid tying Christian claims too closely to unduly
specific, credibility-stretching hypothetical proposals.
If concrete intelligibility were the only worthy goal of a theory of divine action,
then everyone would crowd towards the right side of the diagram. With the
concern for credibility and the associated worries about the destabilizing effects of
undue speculation thrown into the mix, however, there is an impulse to move
toward the left side of the diagram. Balancing these two theological virtues is a
matter of art and each DAP participant found his or her own distinctive way to do
that.
 
Compatibilist theories of SDA
 
Compatibilist views within the DAP were of several kinds. Clayton and Peacocke
articulate versions of panentheism and seek to articulate special divine action in
such a way as to register contemporary scientific discussions of the evolutionary
emergence of complex systems, including especially the realms of life and mind,
from earlier and simpler forms of organization in our universe. The idea of emer-
gence provokes complex debates about ontological levels, causal powers and
forces, and supervenience relations, as well as causation of the whole-part and
top-down kinds that we might make plausible in the natural sphere to as to
stabilize analogies for accounts of SDA. Soskice, Stoeger, and Ward defend varia-
tions of classical theism, in rather neo-Platonist, rather neo-Thomist, and rather
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theopoietic forms, respectively. Thus, they all presume the distinction between the
secondary causes of natural objects or processes and God as the primary cause of
all events in nature, lying behind and supporting the efficacy of secondary causes.
These views are compatibilist because there is no difficulty imagining God acting
freely and noninterventionistically in nature regardless of how causally closed the
scientific portrayal of nature is. Yet all think, on other grounds, that the world is
ontologically indeterministic in important ways that make for meaningful human
freedom and responsibility.
I will not venture to discuss the compatibilist proposals in any detail here, in
part because their consonance with the natural sciences’ portrayal of the complex
process of biological evolution is difficult to evaluate conveniently and in part
because they are still very much under development.
 
18
 
 However, it is important to
note that the DAP became a forum for complex and penetrating debates over the
ideas of top-down causation and whole-part constraint, and that there remains
fairly significant disagreement over precisely how best to understand these terms.
This lack of consensus directly correlates with the proliferation of proposals for
understanding complex biological systems in the wider literature. Other confer-
ences and future research doubtless will lead to gains in clarity around these
issues.
 
Incompatibilist theories of SDA and causation
 
The remainder of this review and analysis will focus on incompatibilist theories of
SDA. At the outset, however, it is important to note that there is widespread
debate (if not outright confusion) in the philosophy of science and in metaphysics
over the nature of causation. This presents a serious difficulty to any incompati-
bilist theory of SDA because the very distinction between compatibilist and
incompatibilist strategies depends on a concept of causation. In practice, this
difficulty is less severe than it might seem at first, so long as we can grant that there
is, 
 
in some sense
 
, a workable concept of “ordinary causation” to which we can
appeal in devising an incompatibilist theory of SDA. Bracketing philosophical
debates over the precise meaning of ordinary causation in this way allows theo-
logical proposals to get started. They cannot travel very far before having to face
two major disputes in the theory of causation that have direct consequences for a
theory of SDA.
The first dispute concerns Alfred North Whitehead’s proposal of the process
model of causation.
 
19
 
 By making God’s action one element in every event (in the
technical sense of an actual occasion), Whitehead appears to solve the theological
problem of SDA and the philosophical problem of causation simultaneously. So
why, we must ask, has not everyone flocked to affirm Whitehead’s view? While
some theologians have done so, many others have not, primarily because White-
head’s view requires abandoning the conception of God as creator, proposing
instead that God and the world are mutually codetermining, coeternal realities.
Philosophers of science are unenthusiastic about Whitehead’s proposal for causa-
tion because it appears unrelated to the natural sciences. Of course, Whitehead
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intended this, deeming it desirable for a metaphysical theory to be consistent with
any possible discovery of the sciences. For their part, however, most philosophers
of science are more interested in detailed consonance and, where possible, direct
consistency constraints between scientific theories and their proposals about
causation. While some DAP participants accepted Whitehead’s theory of causa-
tion (Birch, Barbour, and Haught), most did not, but everyone advancing an
incompatibilist theory of SDA had to make this decision one way or another to
select a specific causal context within which to frame the distinction between
compatibilism and incompatibilism.
The second dispute concerns the feasibility of types of causation other than
ordinary, low-level causation. If theoretical portrayals of top-down, whole-part or
mind-to-mind causation correspond to genuine natural processes, then the
meaning of an incompatibilist theory of SDA might be quite different than would
be the case if ordinary, low-level causation were the only type operative. To
illustrate this, suppose we conceive of top-down causes as ontologically distinct
from ordinary causes organized in complex systems. Then we would be able to
explain (in principle!) the top-down and bottom-up effects that we observe around
us not in terms of the way complex systems constrain and marshal ordinary
causes, but in terms of direct action from a higher level of nature to a lower level,
without any need for ordinary causation at all. This, in turn, would open the
speculative possibility of God being able to act at any level of nature using an
analogous causal joint, one appropriate to God’s top-down relation to the world.
There would be no intervening in the laws of nature on this view because the
divine mode of top-down causation would be as ontologically independent of our
familiar laws of nature as are other forms of top-down causation (such as strong
views of mental causation).
This might seem like a promising option for a theory of SDA but no DAP
participant unambiguously embraced it. I think there are two main reasons for
this. On the one hand, from the point of view of theoretical criteria for the
adequacy of SDA proposals, the “concrete intelligibility” virtue mentioned
above is not satisfied when we invoke a special causal joint that is not related to
the ordinary laws of nature. Of course, this special God-world, top-down causal
joint may have its own laws but they would lie outside the realm of the natural
sciences. On the other hand, there may be no such thing in nature as top-down
causation in this strong sense, as ontologically independent of ordinary causes
marshaled in complex systems. If there is no such thing in nature, then there is
no good reason to propose a special God-world, top-down causal joint, either,
but how would we settle the question of the reality of top-down natural causes
in the strong sense? This takes us back to the same debates over supervenience,
emergence, and reductionism that show up in compatibilist theories of SDA, and
I have already given my reasons for not surveying these here. It is enough to note
that there was disagreement among DAP participants over the best way to
explain the top-down, bottom-up, whole-part, and part-whole features of the
behavior of complex systems and that no DAP participant advanced an incom-
patibilist view of SDA affirming top-down divine causation in this strong
sense.
 
20
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By contrast with the widespread disagreement over the status of top-down
causation, the DAP enjoyed consensus on one issue regarding whole-part
constraint, which I shall explain in what follows. Whole-part constraint describes
an obvious feature of many complex systems whereby larger structures constrain
the behavior of constituent parts. Of course, explanations for whole-part (as well
as part-whole, top-down, and bottom-up) behaviors vary, as just described. It is
clear that merely describing the behavior using the phrase “whole-part
constraint” is not in itself an explanation of it. For a satisfying explanation, we
have to turn to ordinary causation marshaled by complex systems, to top-down
causes ontologically distinct from ordinary causes, or to something else. Similarly,
in the context of incompatibilist theories of SDA, we must specify a causal joint
for God’s action if we imagine it operating in the mode of whole-part constraint.
Having agreed on this much, the DAP consensus ended. Perhaps God influences
wholes (boundary conditions) through causal joints described in other SDA
proposals, such as those to be discussed below. Perhaps it is through top-down
causation in the strong sense discussed above. Perhaps it is through the prim-
ordial creative act itself. Alternatively, perhaps the incompatibilist approach of
specifying causal joints is simply not the best way to go here, so that we can
consider ourselves free to assert that God influences boundary conditions
somehow, even if we cannot say how. Peacocke and Clayton appear to take this
last, compatibilist path, which leads them to seek traction between their SDA
proposals and the natural sciences not through direct constraints but through
large-scale consonance.
The final dispute concerns direct mind-to-mind causation, which presumes a
dualist account of human nature, whereby human beings have minds and souls
somehow related yet not causally reducible to one another. Most DAP participants
deny this dualist account of human nature. Ward has great sympathy for this view
of human nature, however, and so is willing to entertain direct mind-to-mind
causation as one possible mode of divine action.
 
Incompatibilist theories of SDA and chaos theory: Polkinghorne
 
As noted above, one of the major differences among the incompatibilist views
represented in the DAP concerns how to deal with the inevitability that our
current understanding of the laws and processes of nature will change in the
future. Polkinghorne makes a virtue of this, treating current physical laws as
approximations to a suppler, subtler underlying reality, within which God can act
freely and noninterventionistically. He applies this approach especially to chaos
theory, thought of as a physical as well as a mathematical theory.
 
21
 
 Polkinghorne
further proposes that God can insert pure active information with no energy cost
into physical systems thanks to the features of chaotic systems, especially the
infinite closeness of trajectories within chaotic attractors. Then the sensitive
dependence of chaos allows macroscopic effects to emerge from these low-level
changes. Thus, God’s action is not about moving mass-energy so much as
somehow prompting the emergence of new forms of organization.
 
22
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This first part of this proposal—laws of nature as approximations—is perfectly
intelligible, but there has been controversy about the kinds of arguments that
might legitimately count for and against it.
 
23
 
 In particular, critics have targeted
the “realist” strategy by which Polkinghorne argues that epistemological limita-
tions in chaos theory entail ontological openness in nature.
 
24
 
 The epistemological
limitations are well understood: they result from the eventual unpredictability of
chaotic systems, which in turn is because of the way they repeatedly stretch-and-
fold their input domains, produces extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.
 
25
 
Polkinghorne is committed to the program of critical realism, a commitment he
says most scientists share, consciously or unconsciously.
 
26
 
 This program seeks the
“maximum correlation between epistemology and ontology. . . . Its motto is ‘epis-
temology models ontology’; the totality of what we can know is a reliable guide to
what is the case.”
 
27
 
 This instinct lies at the root of the ontological interpretation
that most scientists attach to the epistemological limitation expressed in Heisen-
berg’s Uncertainty Principle and Polkinghorne argues that, “it is a rational and
attractive option to pursue the same strategy in relation to other intrinsic unpre-
dictabilities which we discover in nature.”
 
28
 
 The epistemological limitations of
chaos theory, therefore, “signal that ontologically much of the physical world is
open and integrated in character.”
 
29
 
Polkinghorne’s critics typically are critical realists themselves in one way or
another, so the fulcrum of this debate is not the epistemology-models-ontology
maxim itself, but how it is applied. The eventual unpredictability of chaotic
dynamical systems absolutely requires a deterministic environment (in the way
that the mathematical environment is). It is impossible to take the epistemic
limitations of chaos seriously without taking the deterministic framework equally
seriously. Yet Polkinghorne detaches the underlying deterministic elements of
chaos that his theory needs to explain eventual unpredictability from the
ignorance forced on us by the eventual unpredictability of chaos itself. Then he
applies his “epistemology follows ontology” strategy only to the ignorance part,
despite the dependence of ignorance on determinism (again, in the sense that a
mathematical chaotic system is deterministic).
 
30
 
 Polkinghorne’s move seems
inappropriately arbitrary to his critics within and beyond the DAP project, even
while most agree that nothing blocks the central metaphysical hypothesis of
Polkinghorne’s view that the laws of nature are approximations.
 
31
 
The second part of Polkinghorne’s proposal concerns the causal joint of divine
action. Polkinghorne’s use of the concept of active information presupposes the
detailed continuance of mathematical chaos theory into the supple, subtle physical
reality that he postulates beneath our current laws of nature. For example, both
chaotic attractors and sensitive dependence need to exist in nature for Polking-
horne’s view to make sense. These are delicate features of purely deterministic
mathematical systems that we have little reason to think could survive, and every
reason to believe would vanish, in an indeterministic setting. Something
extremely complex is going on in nature, of course, but it is unlikely to be chaos in
any of its mathematical senses, all of which require very precise conditions only
the controlled environment of mathematical dynamical systems seems suited to
furnish. To put the point ironically, nature seems far too messy for chaos.
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So far, I have defended the feasibility of Polkinghorne’s main hypothesis about
the laws of nature as approximations, and I have raised questions both about the
arguments he advances to support this hypothesis, and about the proposed causal
joint for divine action, but these difficulties may not be decisive and we do well to
consider the matter more carefully.
For the sake of argument, therefore, let us grant Polkinghorne’s hypothesis that
laws of nature are downward emergent approximations to an indeterministic
underlying reality. Furthermore, let us determine to use mathematical chaos as a
conceptual model for describing this indeterministic ontology, including the
causal joint of divine action. To pull this off despite the difficulties just described,
we would have to commit ourselves to a dramatic revision of the basic ideas of
chaos. The concepts of strange attractors, infinitely fine fractals, and sensitive
dependence as we get them from mathematics would have to be rendered usable
in an indeterministic physical environment that seems grainy at the level of the
very small, and lacking the infinite fineness of mathematics. The most promising
place to look for such a reformulation is in quantum chaos, which is why Polking-
horne rightly stresses the importance of quantum chaology for future thinking on
this subject.
 
32
 
 Unfortunately, these basic concepts of chaos theory are so
completely dependent on the determinism of mathematics that quantum chaos
seems a vain hope to me; I think chaos in the strict sense is a mathematical
abstraction not directly relevant to the physical world.
 
33
 
 Nevertheless, there are
enough open questions in quantum mechanics itself that hope remains for a new
kind of chaos theory.
 
34
 
Alternatively, if we do not want to wait to see if quantum chaology proves
successful, perhaps we could try to find ways to loosen the basic dependence of
our proposal on mathematical determinism. For instance, because it is impossible
in principle to show that chaotic attractors do not occur in nature, we might just
continue to assert the thesis that chaos does occur in nature despite the fact that it
seems so improbable and we do not yet have the sort of chaos theory that helps us
make sense of such a claim. Or we might find a way to accommodate the likeli-
hood that chaos does not occur in nature, perhaps by abandoning the concept of
active information in chaotic attractors as an energy-free way for God to intervene,
or perhaps by applying the concept of active information more vaguely to the
world of nature underlying our existing laws.
 
35
 
The weight of consensus within the DAP is that chaos theory is poor evidence
for ontological openness in reality.
 
36
 
 In fact, the impact of chaos theory on debates
over determinism in nature is two sided. On the one hand, chaos theory enhances
any deterministic metaphysical agenda by promising to extend deterministic
explanations to complex phenomena that previously were difficult to handle. This
serves to remove evidence against metaphysical determinism while adding no
further evidence for indeterminism. On the other hand, chaos theory also ensures
that the case for metaphysical determinism can never be completely decisive,
because chaotic systems can never be tested with the perfect precision needed.
 
37
 
Construing chaos theory as evidence for metaphysical indeterminism may be
futile, but the traditional motivations to affirm indeterminism are by no means any
weaker. Human freedom and moral responsibility, as well some interpretations of
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quantum measurement, strongly suggest ontological indeterminism, and chaos
theory does not block these familiar considerations. Inspiration for defense of
ontological indeterminism arises far more naturally from these springs than from
the deterministic well of chaos theory. However, because the inspiration is there,
the central hypothesis of Polkinghorne’s view, that the laws of nature are approxi-
mations, remains perfectly feasible. Though the concept of active information in
chaotic attractors seems too dependent on determinism and on the reality of chaos
in nature to work in its current form, I have argued that these considerations serve
merely to constrain the ongoing development of Polkinghorne’s view.
 
Incompatibilist theories of SDA and quantum mechanics: the possibilities
 
The remaining views on the diagram all develop their positions with reference to
quantum mechanics. This only makes sense, because traction as consistency
increases as we move rightwards through the diagram, and the existence of
stochastic laws governing measurement events allows quantum mechanics to
constrain theological claims about divine action more directly than in other
spheres of science.
The views of SDA at the quantum level (hereafter, QSDA) differ most on the
question of the status of stochastic laws of nature. The three-fold distinction
discussed above captures the relevant features of this disagreement: stochastic
laws may be descriptive, ontological (in the sense of statistically constraining only
ensembles of quantum measurement events), or strong ontological (in the sense of
constraining even individual quantum measurement events). The disagreements
among DAP participants led to a number of different but viable proposals for
objective, incompatibilist, noninterventionist theories of SDA, and I will endeavor
to make clear the reasons DAP proposals diverged.
Despite the friendly disagreements, there was complete agreement on one point,
namely, that the strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic laws of nature was
not the right environment for developing an objective, incompatibilist, non-
interventionist theory of QSDA. Tracy thought that the strong-ontological inter-
pretation of stochastic laws of nature in quantum mechanics is probably
incoherent. Most others thought the idea probably is coherent but rejected the
strong-ontological interpretation as hostile to the goal of a noninterventionist
account of SDA. Of course, some people have claimed both that the strong-
ontological interpretation of stochastic laws of nature in quantum mechanics is
coherent and that theories of QSDA should adopt it, or are somehow committed to
it regardless of their protestations to the contrary.
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 Yet none of the defenders of
QSDA affirms the strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic laws.
The DAP did reach consensus on the various possibilities for QSDA. I will
present these options in what follows. As we get started on this, note that a basic
grasp of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, and especially
quantum measurement, is quite important to avoid errors, so I pause here to give
a quick, non-technical summary.
Our current knowledge of the quantum world seems to allow for several places
at which God might act, arguably without violating any laws of nature. Most
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revolve around the great mystery of quantum mechanics: measurement events.
The Schrödinger equation and its relativistic equivalent the Dirac equation
describe with great precision the apparently deterministic evolution of quantum
systems between measurement events. The model for a quantum system in these
equations is a continuous function, a so-called wave function, which assigns a
complex number to every space-time point in such a way that, roughly speaking,
the square of the wave function is a probability distribution expressing the likeli-
hood that the system will be in a particular state if it were measured.
The mystery of quantum measurement is expressed in Max Born’s “projection
postulate.” Quantum systems when measured are always found in certain basic
states, depending on the quantity being measured, whereas the quantum
formalism represents the state of an evolving quantum system just prior to
measurement as a complicated superposition (linear combination) of these basic
states. Every meaningful sort of measurement is associated with a distinctive set of
basic states. The projection postulate supposes that, when a measurement occurs,
the quantum system irreversibly collapses onto one and only one of the basic
quantum states associated with that sort of measurement. If the same type of
measurement is performed repeatedly on similarly prepared quantum systems,
the resulting statistics show that the probability of obtaining a particular post-
measurement state corresponds precisely to the weighting of the post-
measurement state in the superposition of basic states that is the pre-measurement
wave function.
The quantum formalism is usable and clear on its own terms yet the ontology of
the situation is utterly obscure. How does a superposition of basic states suddenly
lurch into one and only one of those basic states, conforming all the while to the
probabilities specified by quantum theory? What kind of theory predicts measure-
ment outcomes with perfect accuracy using a model of quantum systems that is
ontologically indecipherable? As unsatisfactory as this situation is at the level of
philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics, the mathematical formalism
itself continues to be experimentally robust and extremely accurate.
DAP participants have pointed out that we must assess the prospects for onto-
logical openness capable of supporting a causal joint for non-interventionist
QSDA relative to the various philosophical interpretations of the quantum
formalism. There are a couple of dozen such interpretations. Many of these are
relevant to the question of QSDA but I do not have space for a comprehensive
treatment. Without any discussion, therefore, I make the following simplifying
assertions. Recall that DAP proposals for QSDA sought incompatibilist and nonin-
terventionist theories, which require indeterminism in nature. We can exclude
non-locality and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
 
39
 
 as suitable places to look
for ontological openness, because both are properties of the deterministic
Schrödinger equation, which makes the prospects for ontological openness dim.
 
40
 
Likewise, we can exclude all theories that extend the determinism of the
Schrödinger equation to the theory of quantum measurement using non-local
hidden variables (such as David Bohm’s) because of their rejection of indeter-
minism, and all views that postulate direct divine manipulation of wave functions
because of the interventionism involved. We have to exclude interpretations that
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face serious theoretical difficulties at the level of the physics, such as continuous
spontaneous localization or decoherence theories. Finally, I contend that all of the
relevant philosophical issues surface in two of the remaining interpretations, so
that we can neglect the others. Specifically, the space for non-interventionist divine
action arises in two basic ways: either when the deterministic evolution of a wave
function is disrupted at a non-reversible measurement event, as this is described
within the standard interpretation of the quantum formalism; or in the strange
spaces between quantum worlds that result from measurement events on various
quantum-branch scenarios.
We can picture the options for indeterminism in quantum mechanics by means
of Fig. 1, which portrays measurement events as if they were several frames in
a movie: just before the measurement event, at the onset of the measurement
event, the selection of outcome(s) within the measurement event, and the post-
measurement state(s).
Region 1, the onset of measurement events, is not well understood in quantum
mechanics. Does it require a quantum system to interact with a macro system?
With another quantum system? With consciousness? Most importantly, does it
have a stochastic element? Only in the case that there is some stochastic element
involved in the onset of quantum measurement can we understand region 1 as
involving indeterminism. Decoherence theories explicitly propose this but it is not
difficult to imagine that a stochastic element could be involved on other interpre-
tations, also. The indeterminism of region 2 appears in the stochastic process
governing the selection of outcome events (the projection postulate). Indeter-
minism in region 3 is more difficult to make out. There are no prospects for
indeterminism in region 3 on the standard interpretation but the many-worlds
family of interpretations has more flexibility. In Fig. 1, the rounded shape (marked
3a) is supposed to suggest a stage between determination of outcome states
(region 2) and the reality of split states (region 3b). We can imagine God acting in
region 3a to select among potential worlds before they become actual worlds.
 
Figure 1
 
Regions of indeterminism in quantum measurement events
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Similarly, after quantum splitting has produced actual worlds (region 3b), it is
possible to imagine God acting between these worlds, providing we can construct
a view of indeterminism that applies to the strange ontological spaces between
and among these split worlds.
The three possible locations of indeterminism in this portrayal of a quantum
measurement event lead to six possibilities for objective, incompatibilist theories
of QSDA that we might claim are non-interventionist. I list these six options here
and defer discussion of the question of their status as noninterventionist because
this is their most controversial aspect.
Within the region marked (1), there is one possibility for QSDA in the indeter-
minism that might exist if there is a stochastic element in the onset of quantum
measurement events:
[OPTION #1] God could initiate measurement events.
Within the region marked (2), there are two possibilities for QSDA grounded in
the indeterminism of measurement events:
[OPTION #2] God could adjust probabilities to make an outcome state more
likely.
[OPTION #3] God could select an outcome state.
 
41
 
Within the region marked (3), there are three possibilities for QSDA grounded in
the possibilities for indeterminism associated with many-worlds interpretations:
[OPTION #4], within region 3a: God could behold the array of worlds
produced by a measurement event “just before” they become real, evaluate
them, and then select one world to become actualized while letting the others
never come into being.
[OPTION #5], within region 3b: God could attend to some worlds and neglect
others.
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[OPTION #6], within region 3b: On the many-minds version of the many-
worlds interpretation,
 
43
 
 God could change consciousness so that we are able to
construct a different consistent history of reality than otherwise would be
possible. This view locates indeterminism in the communication between
divine and human consciousness rather than in quantum measurement, but
does not explain how this is possible.
 
44
 
The fifth and sixth options yield meaningful perspectives on QSDA. Whether
we can give OPTION #5 a non-interventionist rendering would depend on what
else we wanted to say about the way God “pays attention.” As far as a causal joint
is concerned, this view reduces to other views, which in the quantum context
means OPTIONS #1–#3. We could argue that QSDA in the sense of OPTION #6 is
non-interventionist on two grounds. On the one hand, we could suppose that no
laws of nature (not even the Schrödinger equation) govern this sort of between-
the-worlds action on the many-minds interpretation. On the other hand, we could
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postulate that the interaction between divine and human consciousness has inde-
terministic elements. In any event, neither OPTION #5 nor OPTION #6 was
formally defended by DAP participants. All of the debates over QSDA swirled
around OPTIONS #1–#4, accordingly. Among these four, OPTIONS #1–#3 apply to
most interpretations of quantum measurement whereas OPTION #4 only arises in
the context of the many-worlds family of interpretations.
The trick in rendering each of the first four options noninterventionistically is to
ensure that the ruling interpretation of stochastic laws of nature in quantum
mechanics is consistent with noninterventionist divine action within the spheres
of indeterminism that each proposes. We have discussed three interpretations of
stochastic laws of nature and each has some consequence for theories of SDA, as
follows.
First, suppose we interpret laws of nature (including stochastic laws) descrip-
tively, with Murphy and Russell. Then, assuming God’s action conforms to these
laws (noninterventionism), they describe not only nature’s operations but also
God’s actions within nature, whenever, wherever, however often, and in whatever
mode those actions occur. This requires the theologian to view SDA not only as
accomplishing God’s providential purposes but also as sufficiently regular and
mathematically intelligible that scientists can frame the laws of nature. It also
strongly invites the theologian to treat the universal aspects of God’s action as the
ultimate explanation for all of the regularities of nature, an invitation that both
Russell and Murphy accept. Once this invitation is accepted, however, given that
the laws of nature describe the overall pattern of divine action regardless of level
or mode, a meaningful connection between SDA and the quantum world may be
in danger. In fact, the only reason to suppose that the quantum level is a distinc-
tive locus for divine action would be that we specify a causal joint for divine
action specifically at the quantum level. It is important, therefore, to engage the
details of quantum mechanics and make a causal joint proposal if we want both a
descriptive account of laws of nature and a concretely intelligible theory of
QSDA.
 
45
 
Second, if we interpret stochastic laws of nature ontologically, in the sense of
constraining only ensembles of events (with Ellis and Tracy), then these laws do
constrain God’s action in a minor way, if it is to be noninterventionist. God must
be sure to make experiments in which scientists gather quantum statistics come
out right. This is definitely an awkward constraint in the sense that human beings
can more or less force God to act in a particular way, constraining the divine
freedom. Yet in practice it is not so severe, particularly if God only acts in some but
not all events, because providentially relevant events are unlikely to include
anything about which scientists can gather quantum statistics.
 
46
 
Finally, if we interpret stochastic laws of nature in the strong-ontological sense,
which constrains each individual quantum measurement event, then any action of
God will violate those laws and noninterventionist versions of QSDA will be
impossible. No DAP participant defending a noninterventionist theory of QSDA
holds this view of the laws of nature, obviously, but some DAP participants
arguing against QSDA (such as Peacocke) appear to believe that this view of
stochastic laws of quantum mechanics is the correct one.
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Incompatibilist theories of SDA and quantum mechanics: two critiques
 
Since Saunders has gone to great lengths to comment on existing proposals for
QSDA,
 
47
 
 it is worthwhile pausing to assess his arguments. We can also generate a
hypothetical but illuminating critique of efforts to develop theories of QSDA
based on Kant’s analysis of the powers of human reason. I will discuss both of
these critiques in what follows.
First, we turn to Saunders. 
 
Divine Action and Modern Science
 
 makes a significant
contribution to debates over SDA especially because Saunders gives detailed
attention to so many of the relevant philosophical, theological, and scientific
issues. In particular, he gives a clear and reasonably accessible presentation of
most of the features of quantum mechanics relevant to deciding whether a
proposal for QSDA is consistent with what scientists believe is the case in
quantum mechanics.
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 His presentation is not quite comprehensive in its coverage
of indeterministic interpretations of the quantum formalism,
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 which matters
because his argument that contemporary theology is in crisis depends on not
overlooking any promising alternatives. Nevertheless, his presentation of
quantum mechanics should prove useful to theologians who want an accessible
introduction to quantum mechanics and its interpretation.
In relation specifically to QSDA, we might ask how Saunders constructs his
argument. Though he does discuss the proposals of Ellis, Murphy, Russell, and
Tracy,
 
50
 
 his primary argument unfolds independently of the consideration of
particular positions.
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 This is helpful because it minimizes debates over fine points
of interpretation and keeps the focus on the conceptual structure of proposals for
QSDA. Saunders follows the incompatibilist strategy of seeking indeterminism in
the quantum realm (which requires selecting an interpretation of the quantum
formalism) and then trying to develop a noninterventionist form of QSDA within
that indeterministic space. For our limited purposes, it is sufficient to consider his
discussion of indeterminism and QSDA relative to the standard interpretation of
the quantum formalism, because all of his disagreements with QSDA proposals
within the DAP emerge in this context.
Rightly rejecting divine manipulation of wave functions between measure-
ments as bluntly interventionist, Saunders identifies three ways in which the
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics may be indeterministic and thus
three ways to conceive of QSDA. These correspond to OPTIONS #1–#3 discussed
above (OPTIONS #4–#6 do not arise for the standard interpretation of the
quantum formalism). So far, then, there is agreement with the DAP on the options
for QSDA. What does he say about each one?
Regarding OPTION #1, which proposes that God may make measurements on a
quantum system, Saunders points out three difficulties. First, the empirical adequacy
of quantum mechanics depends on there being no unexpected collapses intervening
between measurements, as there might be if God initiated measurement events.
Second, because measurements involve the interaction of parts of nature, God cannot
contrive to cause an interaction without intervening. Third, God cannot control the
outcomes of a measurement event using this approach, but only trigger a measure-
ment event and leave the outcome to chance, which is theologically awkward.
 
RTAS1474670042000196612.fm  Page 55  Wednesday, March 17, 2004  2:23 PM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [B
os
to
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] A
t: 
15
:0
4 
9 
A
pr
il 
20
08
 
 
56
 
Theology and Science
 
The first of these objections is unimportant in practice, as there is no reason to
think that God would be providentially initiating measurement events in physics
experiments. Anyway, the vagaries of any experimental apparatus entail that
assessing anomalous data is a statistical process, which leaves plenty of room for
masking divine initiation of measurement events in the statistical noise of experi-
mentation. The third objection is spurious because nothing prevents combining
OPTIONS #1 and #3, thereby allowing God both to trigger measurement events
and to select their outcomes. The second objection is more serious because, on that
view of the onset of measurement events, there is no indeterminism whatsoever.
However, recall that the DAP conclusion about OPTION #1 was that noninterven-
tionist divine initiation of quantum measurement events is possible only if there is
some stochastic element in the onset of measurement and if the relevant laws of
nature are not given a strong-ontological interpretation. There is no reason at this
stage in the development of quantum theory to rule out stochastic elements within
the onset of quantum measurement events. Unfortunately, Saunders does not
address this possibility, but it matters little because no DAP participant
consistently affirmed OPTION #1.
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Regarding OPTION #2, that God may alter the probability of obtaining a par-
ticular result in a quantum measurement event, Saunders’ main objection
coincides with that entered here, namely, and in my terminology, that this option
presumes a strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic laws of quantum
mechanics and thus is interventionist. Of course, the fact that Saunders does not
use the same terminology as the DAP at this point complicates judgment slightly,
but the arguments seem to match.
Regarding OPTION #3, that God may select the result of a measurement event,
Saunders is similarly pessimistic. Unlike the unimportant disagreement over
OPTION #1 and the agreement over OPTION #2, however, the disagreement with
DAP conclusions in the case of OPTION #3 is serious indeed and we very much
need to understand it. Saunders’ lack of clarity about statistical constraint of
ensembles of events versus constraint of individual events in the interpretation of
stochastic laws of quantum mechanics lies at the root of the disagreement. The
categories he uses in his analysis of laws of nature concern whether probabilities
are ontologically prior to or derivative from measurement events. These terms are
too coarse in respect of expressing only two options rather than the three relevant
options (descriptive, ontological, strong-ontological). They are also too vague in
respect of being untranslatable into the language of statistical constraints on
ensembles or theoretical constraints on individual events. Nevertheless, in an
attempt to understand what can be understood, consider Saunders’ key argument
about OPTION #3 [my comments are in square brackets]:
 
The technical substance of this approach is to deny that Born’s probability interpre-
tation of the wave function [i.e. the projection postulate] has any ontological priority
and assert that it is simply an approximate relationship between ensembles of
identical systems for a given measurement repeated a large number of times. The
next move is to interpret quantum laws in a regularitarian methodology [i.e. as
descriptive]—a move that is quite at odds with the position of every proponent of
quantum SDA considered above [including Ellis, Murphy, Russell, and Tracy].
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There appear to be several problems here. First, an ontological interpretation of
the projection postulate does not deny all ontological priority to the probabilities;
it regards them as “ontologically prior” but as constraining ensembles rather than
individual events. Saunders here suggests without argument that we have to
embrace a strong-ontological interpretation of quantum laws of nature. However,
if we really do have to embrace a strong-ontological interpretation of the laws of
nature, then we do not need these two chapters of his book or a bunch of confer-
ences to conclude out that a non-interventionist account of QSDA is impossible.
That is why DAP participants advancing theories of QSDA reject the strong-
ontological interpretation of stochastic laws of nature. Second, Saunders
mistakenly assimilates the ontological and descriptive interpretations of stochastic
laws of nature, thereafter arguing against both by attacking only the descriptive
interpretation. Third, in the final sentence, Saunders simply mischaracterizes the
positions of proponents of QSDA. As a result of these considerations, Saunders’
discussion of OPTION #3 never achieves optimal clarity, his invidious “either/or”
choices overlook more feasible alternatives, and he produces no arguments
capable of unsettling the conclusion of the DAP that OPTION #3 is feasible so long
as we reject a strong-ontological interpretation of the relevant stochastic laws of
nature.
This is a key lapse in a book that usually is argued closely and well. It serves as
evidence for Saunders’ own point, namely, that approaching analysis of options
for SDA with inadequate distinctions (in this case, pertaining to stochastic laws of
nature) can produce misleading results. How did this happen? I would conjecture
that Saunders has an intuition that the strong-ontological interpretation of
stochastic laws must be correct. Yet instead of simply arguing for this and then
drawing the obvious conclusion that noninterventionist QSDA is impossible, he
presents an unnecessarily complicated argument with the same conclusion,
without materially new conceptual elements. Saunders does not adequately
explain his attachment to the strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic laws
of nature, though we should expect to find such an explanation given the way his
argument against QSDA proposals depends on it.
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Moving from Saunders back in time to Kant, we find the inspiration for an
elegant tetralemma argument that can serve as a lens for viewing the strategic
moves made within the DAP as participants sought to develop theories of SDA.
This argument is particularly illuminating in the case of theories of QSDA.
To frame the tetralemma argument, let us assume (contrary to fact, for most
DAP participants) the most demanding criterion for an adequate theory of SDA,
namely, the following conjunction of four propositions: objectivity, incompati-
bilism, noninterventionism, and strong-ontological view of laws of nature. Then
the argument concludes that all theories of SDA fail to meet this criterion. If this
argument against the possibility of SDA is valid—and no view of SDA that I am
aware of challenges the entailment—then we can protect SDA only by weakening
or rejecting one of the four propositions defining the criterion for success. Of
course, no DAP participant accepts this four-fold criterion as the desirable goal for
a theory of SDA. The various moves within the DAP can still be analyzed along
these lines, and there is a payoff in insight for making the effort.
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With the tetralemma argument now in place, let us consider the secret of its
validity (note: not its soundness!). It is an application to the specific context of
QSDA of a more general point that Kant made long ago. Kant argued that we
never could give a causal analysis of reality in such as way to justify our intuitions
of human freedom and moral responsibility.
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 Whenever we try to use our
ordinary reasoning powers (from causes and other such categories) to articulate
and justify human freedom, we find ourselves illustrating his antinomy of pure
reason: we simply cannot get there from here. For Kant, we can only reconcile
categories of causality and human freedom in compatibilist fashion by postulating
human freedom as a condition for the possibility of our experience; we can never
demonstrate its consistency with a causal, scientific account of nature.
Kant’s transcendental philosophy has not survived the transition away from
deterministic Newtonian physics as well as Kant might have wanted, but the deep
point he makes about the antimony of pure reason remains difficult to dismiss. In
our era, we still encounter the phenomenon Kant described: the more precise our
articulation of causal joints, the more elusive ontological openness becomes, and
the more we confirm our suspicions that we need to switch away from an incom-
patibilist approach in order to make the postulate of human freedom credible. In
one respect, Kant’s insight is independent of the apparatus of the transcendental
dialectic of the 
 
Critique of Pure Reason
 
. Science is causal language from beginning
to end and only fitted to describe the causal web of reality. Where the scientific
project of detailing the causal web runs aground, as it does in the quantum
measurement problem, science lapses into silence; there can be no scientific
account of the workings of indeterminism. Within this silence, however, the
speculative metaphysical urge to continue the scientific project of explaining how
things work lifts its voice and keeps us busy, despite its intrinsic limitations. In our
time, it is arguments over the philosophical interpretation of laws of nature that
express this urge. When we accept the strong-ontological interpretation of laws of
quantum mechanics, we drive the controlling powers of scientific laws of nature
all the way into each individual quantum measurement event, thereby subjecting
even ontologically indeterministic processes to rigid (probabilistic) laws that
destroy the incompatibilist project of locating human freedom to act in ontological
indeterminism. That is why Kant was a compatibilist. Moreover, while Kant’s
immediate concern was human freedom to act, his argument applies equally well
to divine freedom to act.
With Kant in mind, we can portray the DAP in general terms as trying to satisfy
the theological urge to locate human and divine freedom in the causal web of
nature while struggling with Kant’s insight about the antinomy of pure reason.
The struggle is least compelling when we reject objective SDA or when Kant’s own
or another compatibilist approach relaxes the tension between categories of
freedom and categories of causation. It is more compelling when we adopt an
incompatibilist approach, and more difficult still when we force our inquiry to
abide by conditions that maximize traction between metaphysics and science,
such as ontological interpretations of the laws of nature and non-interventionism.
As our causal account of the joint of divine action becomes most precise, as it does
if we embrace the four-fold criterion of the tetralemma argument, we will discover
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exactly what Kant implied that we would, namely, that the vision of divine
freedom to act vanishes the way a mirage in the desert vanishes when we
approach it. To avoid this, we will have to pull out of the intellectually suicidal
dive that speculative metaphysics takes us on: we will have to relax the constraints
that maximize traction between metaphysics and science or else collide with the
immovable fact that we can never argue from categories of causality to categories
of freedom. Our choice is when to pull out of the dive. Which of the traction-
maximizing constraints on our inquiry will we relax?
Within the DAP, the problem does not arise for Davies, Drees, and others who
deny the objectivity of SDA. Clayton, Peacocke, Soskice, Stoeger, and Ward realize
the prognosis early on and submit more completely than others do to Kant’s
strictures on speculative metaphysics.56 The others stay on course for Kant’s
predicted collision longer by embracing objectivity, incompatibilism, and
noninterventionism. Within this metaphysically more aggressive sphere of
theological work, traction (as consistency) between theology and science is stron-
gest, yet there are still ways to position theories of SDA that avoid Kant’s anti-
nomy. That is, we can still ask precisely where and how in our speculative
metaphysical interpretation of quantum measurement events God is supposed to
act. In this way, we will entertain a more detailed causal story (though of course
elaborated not scientifically but metaphysically) and more heavily constrain our
theological assertions about divine freedom. Polkinghorne weakens the incompat-
ibilist commitment by stressing the provisional status of existing laws of nature.
Murphy and Russell treat the laws of nature as describing God’s universal (or in
Russell’s case almost universal) action in nature. Ellis and Tracy accept an ontolog-
ical interpretation of laws of nature, which statistically constrains ensembles of
quantum events but not individual measurement events, and thereby enjoy the
greatest degree of traction, but they too avoid the Kantian specter of the collapse
of speculative metaphysics. If we maximize traction still further by accepting
(with Saunders?) a strong-ontological interpretation of the stochastic laws of
quantum mechanics, then the inability of causal categories to comprehend
categories of freedom will force us to conclude that prospects for theories of QSDA
are grim, and Kant’s prophecy of doom will be fulfilled.
If the argument here is correct, then the relaxation of constraints—constraints
that theories of SDA use to generate traction (as consistency) between science and
theology—is unavoidable, for Kant’s reasons. Nevertheless, it is also unproblem-
atic so long we regard the demanding four-fold criterion as dispensable. In terms
of this Kantian perspective, I think Saunders’ critique amounts to holding an
inevitable outcome of a speculative metaphysical venture against the theorists, as
if they could with more care or more imagination or more attention to detail
somehow avoid it. With that in mind, we might consider steering away from
representing the relaxation of ideal constraints on theories of SDA as failures to
reach a goal, which after all is illusory anyway. Rather, having established the
technical feasibility of SDA proposals, we should celebrate the artistry of these
intellectuals. We should then understand this artistry in terms of the way traction
is first maximized for the sake of concrete intelligibility of theological proposals,
and then relaxed in a variety of ways for the sake of avoiding the collapse of
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theories of SDA under the implacable weight of the tetralemma argument and the
limitations of human reason that it describes.
Incompatibilist theories of SDA and quantum mechanics: specific proposals
Having articulated the options for QSDA and defended the feasibility of most
options in general terms, I now briefly analyze similarities and differences among
the four specific proposals made within the DAP: those of Ellis, Murphy, Russell,
and Tracy.57
These four views have in common the view of the causal joint of divine action:
it is OPTION #3, above. This option hypothesizes that God selects the outcomes of
measurement events. Russell has experimented in his published writings with
OPTION #1, that God initiates measurement events,58 and Murphy has experi-
mented with OPTION #4.59 No DAP participant formally defended OPTION #5 or
OPTION #6, though I explored the latter in the final conference meeting,60 and
OPTION #2 is not promising, as noted above. Of all DAP participants, Tracy has
most clearly resisted the idea that one has to choose one approach rather than
others; in fact, he has clearly stated that he does not hold that God acts only at the
quantum level, or even exclusively in causal gaps in nature.61
The differences among the four DAP participants advancing specific quantum-
level proposals for SDA pertains to the scope of divine action, in thee senses. First,
there is the question about whether God acts especially at the quantum level
always and everywhere or only at particular places and times. This difference is
most evident in the comparison of Murphy’s affirmation of divine action at every
time and place62 with Tracy’s view of intermittent quantum special divine action.63
Ellis sides with Tracy on this issue. Interpreting Russell’s view on this point is
more complex but his developed view is quite clear: God acts in all quantum
measurement events and only refrains from acting when a free, conscious agent
acts instead.64
Second, in relation to those theories postulating that God acts in all quantum
events (Murphy and Russell), there is the question of whether God’s special action
is necessary to those events, and in what sense.65 Everyone in this debate wants to
avoid the theologically and morally objectionable view of occasionalism, whereby
God is the only actor in reality and the laws of nature merely describe divine
action rather than structures of reality created by God to have some measure of
independence. Occasionalism represents the strongest sense in which God’s
special action might be necessary for ordinary events (in any sense of “event”):
God is the ontological condition for the possibility that ordinary events occur at all
and determines every event. Near the opposing end of a spectrum of views of the
necessity of God’s action (see the diagram, below) lies Russell’s view, namely, that
God does not need to act in any event, beyond merely sustaining creation in
existence, but acts intentionally in every event anyway in order to accomplish
providential purposes. Of course, rather many quantum measurement events in
cosmic history may seem providentially irrelevant, but part of divine providence
on Russell’s view is God’s faithful maintenance of patterns of regularity in nature.
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The Divine Action Project 61
Between these two extremes are a number of views that reject occasionalism yet
affirm that God’s special action is ontologically necessary in some sense. For
example, toward the Russell end of the spectrum, one interpretation of the
process metaphysics account of causation has God playing an ontologically essen-
tial but not a constitutive role in every event, in the sense that God must exercise
influence in some events or the world as we see it would not be possible (the
ontologically essential part). Yet, if God did not furnish an initial aim to a
particular actual occasion, concrescence of that occasion would still occur (the
non-constitutive part). On another view of process causality, God’s action is more
than ontologically essential; it is constitutive though still not determinative for
every event because it conveys structured possibilities to each actual occasion,
without which concrescence would not occur. Toward the occasionalism end of
the spectrum lies the view of divine determinism, which posits some degree of
independence of the created world from God (as in process metaphysics) and
assigns God the role of selecting every outcome of every event (as in occasion-
alism). The precise sense in which God is necessary to every event differs among
the several variants of this view. Karl Heim thought that God determined every
aspect of the world through action at the quantum level.66 William Pollard seems
to argue much the same, despite his more comprehensive way of expressing
himself.67 In these cases of omnideterminism, the necessity of God’s action seems
to amount to the strong claim that God must play this role if nature is to function
properly. Within the DAP, Murphy seems closest to Heim and Pollard (as the
phrase “hidden variable” and other references suggest).68 Murphy also refers to
the principle of sufficient reason in justifying her construal of God’s universal
action at the quantum level, which is another type of necessity. Yet Murphy is
clear that God voluntarily respects the “natural rights” of all created entities,
which probably evades divine determinism and certainly affirms the beauty and
order of God’s creation.69
Third, there is the question about the situations in which God acts at the
quantum level, and whether God constrains divine action in order to support the
flourishing of free, conscious creatures such as us. Russell imagines a shift in
divine strategy. Prior to the emergence and outside the realm of free, self-
conscious creatures, Russell proposes that God works in all events to bring about
the divine will for the natural world, from cosmos to ecosphere. Russell further
hypothesizes a grace-filled, kenotic contraction of this divine activity in order to
create the possibilities needed to make freedom meaningful for self-conscious
moral creatures such as human beings. Divine providence withdraws to allow
such creatures the freedom they need to explore their moral potential, and God no
longer acts in all quantum events but only in some.70 Both phases of divine activity
involve the same mechanism of divine action and differ only in scope.71 Moreover,
every quantum event has either God or a created conscious agent acting in it, yet
this action is not constitutive of these events, in the sense that events would still
occur even if God did not act. Russell’s motivation for asserting the universality of
divine action while not following Murphy in making divine action constitutive of
quantum measurement events is theological in character: he wants to secure the
omnipresence and omni-activity of God. George Ellis proposes that the principal
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Table 3 Characteristics of views of Special Divine Action at the Quantum Level
God can act freely God can only persuade God can act freely
God acts specially in all events God acts specially in some events
but not in others
God’s action is universal in scope Everywhere
except realm of
sentience
Anywhere
providentially
relevant
Especially
human minds
God’s special action is constitutive of events
(events cannot occur unless God acts specially)
God’s special action is not constitutive of events
(events occur whether or not God acts)
God determines every event
(divine omnideterminism)
God respects the created rights and ontological independence of creatures
and does not determine every event
God is the only 
actor
God sustains the activity of other creatures and processes
Occasionalism Heim, Pollard Murphy Process (strong) Process (weak) Russell Tracy Ellis
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The Divine Action Project 63
(perhaps exclusive) mode of God’s action is at the quantum level. He construes
God’s purpose to be the communication of divine inspiration and guidance to
human beings, along the lines of the Quaker belief in the experience of the light of
God within, all the while respecting the freedom of human beings to make their
own choices.72
Table 3 presents the dimensions of variation among views of QSDA. The
diagram uses rows to express the relevant characteristics of proposals for QSDA
and columns to line up combinations of characteristics with the eight particular
views mentioned above.
Though the territory is complex, the DAP’s conclusion is clear: there are several
viable possibilities for theories of SDA at the quantum level.
Conclusion
I have here presented my reading of the DAP’s conclusions and analyzed the
disagreements among participants, with special reference to the papers and
discussions of the recent capstone meeting. I have also addressed a couple of
criticisms of proposals made within the project. We can now return to the question
with which we began, namely, whether contemporary theology is in crisis because
of a failure to present a credible theory of SDA, as Saunders alleges, or whether in
fact theology has made significant progress in this area.
I have tried to explain the root of the disagreement between many DAP partici-
pants and Saunders, tracing it back to the insensitivity of his analytical categories
to the three-way distinction among interpretations of stochastic laws of nature
used within the DAP. If Saunders were to allow that correction to his otherwise
impressive argument, it seems that his conclusion about SDA at the quantum level
could not help but be more positive. Moreover, Saunders seems optimistic about
Polkinghorne’s general strategy of treating the laws of nature as approximations
to an underlying indeterminate reality within which God can act freely, even
though he shares my concerns about Polkinghorne’s way of using chaos theory to
articulate a causal joint. Saunders also seems sympathetic toward compatibilist
proposals, especially Peacocke’s. On the terms of his own argument, therefore, and
quite apart from the key dispute over interpretation of laws of nature, I cannot
quite see why Saunders is so pessimistic. From my point of view, theological
theories of SDA are as strong as they have been at any time since Hume and Kant,
and this is largely because of the contributions of the DAP.
In closing, it is important to note that many issues discussed in the DAP do not
register at all in my survey to this point. Perhaps most prominent among the issues
so far unmentioned is the problem of good and evil, and particularly the related
problem of theodicy. There was wide agreement among DAP participants that any
postulate of SDA exacerbates the theodicy problem,73 so a lot of energy was
expended in trying to deal with this. In particular, the tendency to affirm universal
divine action, whether in process metaphysics (Barbour, Birch, Haught) or in
personalist theism (Murphy, Russell74) seemed motivated in part by the desire to
minimize, without eliminating, the severity of the theodicy problem. Likewise,
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64 Theology and Science
some (including Ellis75) invoked the concept of kenosis outside its original sphere
of application in Christology to explain why God does not act more often to ease
pain and to educate us wayward creatures who so obviously need more guidance
than we get. In this way, kenosis was used to strengthen the best-world, free-will,
and free-process defenses of God’s goodness that various participants articulated
(especially Tracy76). Some participants thought that no amount of rational reflec-
tion would yield a satisfying answer to the question of God’s goodness on best-
world or free-will grounds. They argued for a return to one traditional Christian
approach (not strictly a solution) to the problem, which has God somehow sharing
in the suffering of the world through the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus
(Edwards, Moltmann, Russell77). Still others (Drees, Wildman) regard the problem
of theodicy as crippling to all proposals of SDA and so propose interpretations of
ultimate reality that reject the idea that God can form intentions and act specially
at all. It was obvious to all within the DAP that the problem of good and evil, and
the related problem of theodicy, require more attention than we were able to give
them in the context of our study of SDA, but that is no surprise. The road of
theological inquiry goes ever onwards.78
Appendix A: decision tree diagram of options in theories of special 
divine action
The virtue of a decision tree is to draw attention to key choices that theorists of
SDA make, explicitly or implicitly, on their way to settled views. The disadvantage
is that all interesting views are always subtler than a diagram can represent,
balancing many complex considerations. It follows that a figure is no substitute for
a detailed understanding of the textured views themselves. I defined the termi-
nology in the decision tree figure (Fig. A1) within the body of this essay. Some
features of the figure are difficult to grasp without commentary, however, so this
Appendix includes a brief explanation of the figure.
The decision tree links related positions using a simple line and bracket system.
For example, the decision to represent Ultimate Reality theistically or non-
theistically corresponds to the left-most bracket on the figure. The next decision
arises within the theistic context, and pertains to God’s nature: God either can or
cannot (literally) act intentionally. The figure records the fact that I hold the latter
view (labeled “God as Ground of Being or Being Itself” on the diagram) while
most DAP participants hold the former. In general, the names of views are printed
in small italic type, the holders of views in small bold type, and the propositions
characterizing the content of views in larger normal type. The figure’s presenta-
tion of any particular position as the outcome of a sequence of decisions means
that we can describe each view as a conjunction of the propositions characterizing
the decisions made. For example, Ellis’s view affirms (Ultimate Reality as God)
and (God can [literally] act intentionally) and (God does act intentionally) and
(God Can Choose to Act Intentionally Only in Some Events [yet May Act in All
Events]) and (God Causally Initiates Specific Events) and (God Acts in Conformity
with Natural Laws) and (God’s Mode of Action is Rationally Approachable) and
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The Divine Action Project 65
Figure A1 Decision tree diagram for theories of special divine action
Causal Joints Defended by DAP Participants
Combinations of Quantum-Level Changes, Chaotic Amplification,
Active Information, Top-Down Causation, Whole-Part Constraint
Ellis, Polkinghorne, Russell, Tracy
Causal Joints Not Defended by DAP Participants
Atemporal Causation, Direct Mind-to-Mind Influence
God’s Action Requires Ontological Openness for Causal Joint
(Views within this bracket adopt incompatibilist assumptions)
Modes of Action Defended by DAP Participants
Top-Down Causation and Whole-Part Constraint
Clayton, Peacocke, Tracy
Modes of Action Not Defended by DAP Participants
World-As-God’s-Body, Mental-Causation Models
God’s Action is Consistent with Causal Closure of Reality
(Views within this bracket adopt compatibilist assumptions)
Causal Joint of Divine Action Can Be Discussed to Some Degree
Causal Joint is Obscure but Divine Action Can be Made Credible
Fallback Position for Some DAP Representatives (also a live view, eg. Farrer)
God’s Mode of Action is Rationally Approachable
God’s Mode of Action is Utterly Mysterious
No DAP Representatives (but it is a live view, eg. Barth, forms of mysticism)
God Acts in Conformity with Natural Laws
(Views within this bracket adopt non-interventionist assumptions)
God Acts Miraculously Disregarding Natural Laws
Miracle Theism (views adopting interventionist assumptions)
Tracy (also much traditional personalist theism)
God Causally Initiates Specific Events
God Designates Some Events to be Special Divine Acts
Personalist Versions of Primary-Secondary Causation Models
Edwards, Happel, Stoeger
God Can Choose to Act Intentionally Only in Some Events (yet May Act in All Events)
God Determines Every Event
Various Forms of Divine Determinism and Predestination
No DAP Representatives (but it is a live view, eg. Heim, Pollard)
God Influences Every Event
Varieties of Process Theism
Barbour, Birch, Haught
God Selects Every Event
God as Acting in All Quantum Measurement Events
Murphy
God Facilitates Every Event
Mechanistic Versions of Primary-Secondary Causation Models
God Necessarily Acts Intentionally in Every Event
(Views within this bracket vary regarding compatibilist and incompatibilist assumptions)
God Does Act Intentionally
God Does Not Act Intentionally
Deism
Davies
God Can (literally) Act Intentionally
God Cannot (literally) Act Intentionally
God as Ground of Being or Being Itself
Wildman
Ultimate Reality as God (Theism)
Non-Theistic Views of Ultimate Reality (or Ultimate Realities or Ultimacy)
Most Varieties of Buddhism, Chinese Religion, Religious Naturalism, . . .
Drees
Ultimate Reality
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66 Theology and Science
(Causal Joint of Divine Action Can Be Discussed to Some Degree) and (God’s
Action Requires Ontological Openness for Causal Joint). The figure does not
describe the particular causal joint that Ellis defends; see the body of the essay for
that.
We can imagine a more complex figure with further decisions drawn in under
most views. Several other figures within this paper elaborate the more compli-
cated parts of the tree so as to draw out subtler distinctions among DAP views
lumped together in this figure. The view that (God Causally Initiates Specific
Events) receives the most attention because that is where most debate within the
DAP took place. The diagram shows how decisions specifying this view are either
interventionist or noninterventionist, and how the latter views are compatibilist or
incompatibilist. It is important to note, however, that other parts of the diagram
could be elaborated in the same way. For example, the view that (God Necessarily
Acts Intentionally in Every Event) includes both compatibilist and incompatibilist
options, but these are not distinguished in the figure itself.
The figure has a number of more serious limitations. For example, Tracy’s
attempt to defend the intelligibility of several modes of divine action means that
his name appears several times on the figure. Murphy’s view is awkwardly distant
from other quantum-level proposals on the diagram because it asserts “God
Necessarily Acts Intentionally in Every Event.” The distinction between more
personalist (Thomistic) and more mechanistic (Aristotelian) variations on the
primary-secondary causation model is important, but these views are listed sepa-
rately from the “God as Ground of Being or Being Itself” view, which is unfortu-
nate. Moreover, the distinction between Non-Theistic and Ground-of-Being views
is difficult to stabilize. Finally, the concept of Ultimate Reality is extremely conten-
tious within religious studies.
Endnotes
1 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (New York and Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 2002). Saunders concludes, “Would it be correct to argue on the
basis of the foregoing critique that the prospects for supporting anything like the
‘traditional understanding’ of God’s activity in the world are extremely bleak? Largely
the answer to this question must be yes. In fact it is no real exaggeration to state that
contemporary theology is in crisis” (215; italics in original).
2 The volumes in the DAP series, together with corresponding conferences and the
abbreviations of volumes used throughout this paper, are as follows. All are published
jointly by Vatican Observatory Publications and the Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences and distributed by Notre Dame University Press, and all have the
subtitle Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action.
Publication Conference
Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature [QCLN], eds Robert 1992, Rome
J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, C. J. Isham (1993)
Chaos and Complexity [CC], eds Robert John Russell, Nancey 1994, Berkeley
Murphy, Arthur Peacocke (1995)
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology [EMB], eds Robert John 1996, Rome
Russell, William R. Stoeger, Francisco J. Ayala (1998)
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Publication Conference
Neuroscience and the Person [NP], eds Robert John Russell, 1998, Poland
Nancy Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, Michael A. Arbib (1999)
Quantum Mechanics [QM], eds Robert John Russell, Philip 2000, Rome
Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, John Polkinghorne (2001)
Prior to the first conference there was a preliminary and preparatory conference that
produced the volume Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for Under-
standing [PPT], eds George V. Coyne, Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger (Notre Dame
University, 1988). A related book concerns the views of Pope John Paul II, together with
expert commentary: John Paul II on Science and Religion: Reflections on the New View from
Rome, eds Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V. Coyne (Notre Dame
University, 1990). The Evolutionary and Molecular Biology volume includes an address
given by Pope John Paul II to the Vatican Observatory Conference at the 1996 meeting.
A book may or may not flow from the final capstone conference. Summaries of all 5
introductions and 91 articles, the work of 50 authors, are available on the CTNS website,
http://www.ctns.org/books.html.
3 See Maurice Wiles, God’s Action in the World (London: SCM, 1986).
4 It may also be worth noting that, though I do not know Saunders personally, I have a
great deal of respect for the Cambridge advisor of the dissertation from which the book
flows, Sir John Polkinghorne, and for Saunders’ sometime discussion partner, Arthur
Peacocke, both of whom have been key participants in the DAP. Needless to say, I hope
these warm thoughts and feelings do not interfere with my judgment.
5 The other effective project was the Boston-based Crosscultural Comparative Religious
Ideas Project, led by Robert Neville, Peter Berger, and John Berthrong. The output of this
series of 25 day-long conferences was three volumes, all edited by Neville and published
by SUNY Press in 2001: The Human Condition, Ultimate Realities, and Religious Truth.
6 It is not easy to classify people, particularly in the case of participants such as Ernan
McMullin and Fraser Watts. The list of specialist participants in the DAP not already
mentioned and without categorization (and probably not error free), is as follows:
Michael Arbib; Francisco Ayala; Michael Berry; Leslie Brothers; Jeremy Butterfield;
Camilo Cela-Conde; Julian Chela-Flores; Michael Chiao; Chris Clarke; Anne Clifford;
James Cushing; Paul Davies; Langon Gilkey; Joel Green; Andrej Grib; Peter Hagoort;
Chris Isham; Marc Jeannerod; Fergus Kerr; Bernd-Olaf Küppers; Joseph LeDoux; John
Lucas; Gisele Marty; Theo Meyering; Michael Redhead; and Abner Shimony. One
question the DAP did not answer is why this list of specialist participants is so improb-
ably loaded toward the first half of the alphabet. Note that the capstone conference
included participants on the theological side not previously involved in conferences:
Paul Allen; Niels Gregersen; Owen Thomas; Kirk Wegter-McNelly (involved in editing
several DAP volumes); and Mark Worthing.
7 St Thomas’s analogy of being famously must confront difficulties about human
ignorance of the divine mode of being. Karl Barth’s analogy of faith begs questions of
biblical authority and sources for theological knowledge. Communitarian theologies
that try to stabilize theological terms with reference to practices and beliefs of a
community pretend at epistemological self-containment and independence from other
forms of knowledge, whereas this is demonstrably not the case.
8 See Happel, “Metaphors and Time Asymmetry: Cosmologies in Physics and Christian
Meanings,” in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature; Happel, “Divine Providence
and Instrumentality: Metaphors for Time in Self-Organizing Systems and Divine
Action,” in Chaos and Complexity; Heller, “Generalizations from Quantum Mechanics to
God,” in Chaos and Complexity, especially 191–193; and Watts, “Cognitive Neuroscience
and Religious Consciousness,” in Neuroscience and the Person, especially 340–341. Soskice
was particularly conscious of issues about the status of theological language.
9 This survey does not cover the DAP’s discussions of GDA, mostly because the focus was
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on SDA. The Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature volume contains the essays that
paid most attention to GDA, and the key paper on this topic is probably Russell, “Finite
Creation without a Beginning: The Doctrine of Creation in Relation to Big Bang and
Quantum Cosmologies.”
10 See Russell, “Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology, and Scientific Cosmology,” Resurrection:
Theological and Scientific Assessments, eds, Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, Michael
Welker (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 2002), 3–30; the diagram and associated discus-
sion are on 10–17. Alternatively, see Russell, “Eschatology and Physical Cosmology: a
Preliminary Reflection,” The Far Future Universe: Eschatology from a Cosmic Perspective,
ed. George F. R. Ellis (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation, 2002), 266–315; the diagram
and discussion are on 275–279, 284–288.
11 In “Special Providence and Genetic Mutation,” Russell states that he does not wish to
disparage interventionism but only resist its unnecessary use, acknowledging that
interventionist readings of such events as incarnation and resurrection “might be justi-
fiable and necessary after suitable nuancing, since when the domain of God’s action is
eschatological the ‘laws of nature’ (i.e. God’s faithful action) themselves will be different
and ‘intervention’ may cease to be a useful concept” (Evolutionary and Molecular Biology
200, fn. 21). We might construe this idea as interventionist, non-interventionist, or even
more-than-interventionist, depending on our point of view. Thus, Russell’s view of
eschatologically momentous events shows that the categories of interventionism and
noninterventionism are somewhat inflexible. Yet the distinction remains useful for
many purposes.
12 Ward cites the view of Rom Harré that we should interpret the regularities of nature, not
as laws but as inherent capacities or dispositions or tendencies of objects. This view
underlies Ward’s conception of the potential for transformation within human beings.
13 See the diagrams in the Introductions to Chaos and Complexity and Quantum Mechanics.
14 Among DAP participants, Tracy was particularly concerned to defend the possibility
that one might be a compatibilist in respect of one sort of divine action and an incompat-
ibilist with respect to another. If Tracy is correct, then of course theo-physical (in)deter-
minism would be importantly different than anthropo-physical (in)determinism.
Specifically, unlike divine action as Tracy imagines it, we must conceive of human action
either in compatibilist or in incompatibilist terms, but not both, because human beings
are always subject to the regularities of nature. This is one example of the care the DAP
took to notice failures of the analogy between divine and human action, as well as
similarities between the two.
15 The ontological options expressed here are translations into this context of the major
options in the medieval debates over universals: the realists spoke of universals as
having independent reality (this corresponds to the ontological approach, which has
empiricist and rationalist versions), whereas their nominalist opponents denied any
reality to universals (this corresponds to the descriptive approach). Meanwhile, the
Scotists affirmed the independent reality of universals but insisted that they were only
ever present in “contracted” fashion as the form of the actual concrete being of particu-
lars (this view is also included here under the ontological approach).
16 Another reason (Stoeger’s and the Thomists’) for this intuition is that quantum-level
SDA makes God an ordinary (secondary) cause like other causes. Of course, this concern
potentially applies to SDA in any mode.
17 See Robert Cummings Neville, God the Creator (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968).
Note that John Scottus Eriugena also speaks about God determining the divine nature in
the act of creation.
18 Peacocke’s view is laid down in Theology for a Scientific Age, enlarged edition (London:
SCM, 1993). Clayton intimates his view in a few existing publications but the main work
has not yet appeared.
19 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected edition (New York: Macmillan, 1978).
20 Of course, the phrase “top-down” is used in many ways, which makes a precise
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discussion difficult to achieve. For example, my working hypothesis is that ordinary
causes marshaled by complex systems are sufficient to explain all of the behavior we see
around us, including mental causation. I also hold that the dignity and value of minds
and ideas is secured by their ontological status as emergent realities, even though this
weak sort of emergence does not entail any strong form of mental causation as new
causal powers ontologically irreducible to ordinary causation operating within the
complex world of brains-in-contexts. (I care more about securing the value of minds and
ideas than I do about their ontological status.) Clayton disagrees, taking his stand on the
view that certain emergent levels of reality do confer new and irreducible causal
powers, pointing especially to life and mind, but taking the final decision on precisely
where these new levels of causal power emerge to be largely an empirical question.
While these are very different views in respect of their presuppositions about the
ontology of causation, both are characterized as affirming “top-down” causation at one
point or another in the confusing literature on the subject. From this, it follows that, in
this area as in so many others, names for positions are invidious and that only patient
conversation can discriminate genuinely different views in satisfying ways.
21 See Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” in Chaos and Complexity. He
writes, “The deterministic equations from which classical chaos theory developed are
then to be interpreted as downward emergent approximations to a more subtle and
supple physical reality. They are valid only in the limiting and special cases where bits
and pieces are effectively insulated from the effects of their environment. In the general
case, the effect of total context on the behavior of parts cannot be neglected” (153).
22 See Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 154.
23 Saunders has suggested that Polkinghorne’s position has been widely misinterpreted
but most of his citations are to positions that I think interpret the [Polkinghorne] view
correctly and merely dispute the arguments Polkinghorne uses to support it; see Divine
Action and Modern Science, 186–196, especially 186 and 196. In fact, Saunders makes the
same critique of Polkinghorne’s epistemology-models-ontology argument that Drees,
Murphy, Tracy, Russell, and others have made. I do not see evidence in Saunders’
presentation to support his claim of widespread misinterpretation.
24 Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 147–149, 153.
25 See the description in Wildman and Russell, “Chaos: a Mathematical Introduction with
Philosophical Reflections,” Chaos and Complexity, 71–74.
26 Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 147–148.
27 Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 148.
28 Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 148–149.
29 Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” Chaos and Complexity 153.
30 Polkinghorne sometimes speaks as if the determinism insisted on by his critics is the
physical determinism expressed in Newton’s mechanics, when he writes “the claim that
chaos theory is intrinsically deterministic” both that “[t]his claim was made by several
contributors to Chaos and Complexity” and that this claim “depends upon taking the
Newtonian equations as given and unquestionable—a decision that simply preempts
the metaphysical issues from the start” (189, including fn. 8). While I am entirely
sympathetic to resisting any preemptive settling of metaphysical questions of deter-
minism, Polkinghorne’s characterization of the views expressed in Chaos and Complexity
blends physical and mathematical determinism in a deeply misleading way. Chaos
theory only requires mathematical determinism. The question is how this affects our
subsequent attempts to decide whether physical reality is deterministic or indetermin-
istic.
31 One critique has gone further. Murphy argued in Chaos and Complexity not only that the
reasoning of Polkinghorne’s argument is logically flawed but also that the position itself
cannot be saved: “Is this move in Polkinghorne’s thought simply an instance of using a
bad argument for a position that may well be defensible on other grounds? I think not”
(327). This more aggressive, second phase of Murphy’s critique raises an excellent point,
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70 Theology and Science
namely, that Polkinghorne’s thesis of divine input of active information is difficult to
translate into a concrete setting (her amusing example is of Father Murphy trying to
save his school in a high-stakes game of pool). This critique deserves an answer but does
not clinch Murphy’s argument. As far as I can see, nothing can block the hypothesis that
our existing laws are approximations to the deep structures of nature.
32 For example, see Polkinghorne, “Physical Process, Quantum Events, and Divine
Agency,” Quantum Mechanics 189.
33 If entering a contest to predict the future of quantum chaos, I would place my bet on
there being no future for it at all. I think it is most likely that chaos occurs nowhere in
nature, that it is a misleading artifact of non-linear dynamical systems in mathematics
that we find exciting in the same way that the abstract ideas of points and lines and
planes are intriguing but occur nowhere in nature. It is a beautiful artifact, to be sure, but
chaotic orbits and attractors of chaotic systems have never been used successfully in
physical modeling and never can be because of intrinsic limits on testing. We can use
non-linear dynamical systems for models but we can never take the chaotic part of those
models seriously. Moreover, the lumpiness of nature at the atomic level, and beneath
that the quantum level, suggests that we are going to have to tell the incredibly rich and
intricate story of complex systems in nature, without recourse to chaos in nature.
Saunders makes the latter point about the impossibility of realizing in nature the
delicate fractal geometry of chaotic attractors; see Divine Action and Modern Science,
186–196, especially 194–195.
34 It may be, for example, that deterministic “hidden-variables” interpretations of quantum
mechanics, such as Bohm’s, or modal interpretations, have potential for elaborating a
quantum theory of chaos that the standard interpretation does not, which may in turn
count as evidence in favor of such interpretations.
35 Polkinghorne himself notes the problem with his view of the causal joint, thanking
Saunders for the insight. While Polkinghorne provides no solution, he does indicate that
he prefers keeping the concept of active information but reformulating it to accommo-
date the breakdown of the fractal geometry of chaotic attractors, “at least at Heisenberg
energy uncertainties”; see Quantum Mechanics 189.
36 If chaos theory were the deepest inspiration for a reenergized contemporary defense of
ontological indeterminism, then the practical epistemological limitations suffusing the
deterministic mechanics of Newton already would have inspired enthusiasm for onto-
logical indeterminism. It did not work that way with Newton and it should not work
that way with chaos theory either.
37 See Wildman and Russell, “Chaos: A Mathematical Introduction with Philosophical
Reflections,” in Chaos and Complexity, especially 75–83.
38 Within the DAP, this criticism was advanced most notably by Peacocke. Some others
shared his intuition on this point. Outside of the DAP, Saunders appears to hold this
view; see below for the details.
39 In so far as the Uncertainty Principle describes measurement outcomes, it is included in
the measurement problem, which is the focus of attention in the analysis below.
40 Note, however, that Wegter-McNelly’s recent dissertation, Created Wholeness, argues that
quantum entanglement and non-locality furnish analogies that are useful for articu-
lating a compatibilist theory of SDA.
41 OPTION #3, that God selects outcome states, seems closely related to OPTION #2, that
God adjusts the probabilities of measurement outcomes, with the difference being
merely that God assigns a probability of 100% to one possible outcome and 0% to all
others. We cannot simply collapse the distinction between the two views, however,
because OPTION #2 seems to assume a strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic
laws of quantum mechanics as constraining individual quantum measurement events,
whereas OPTION #3 is more neutral on the question of how to interpret the stochastic
laws of quantum mechanics.
42 While this option is not a causal joint proposal like the first four options, and while it
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The Divine Action Project 71
exacerbates the theodicy problem rather bluntly, it is worth pondering. OPTION #5
imagines that God allows all universes to exist but eventually loses interest in the
“failures” and pays attention to and answers prayers only in the worlds that prove
interesting to God. This is a kind of natural selection of worlds where the outcome is not
survival of the fittest but maintaining the divine focus of attention and action. This view
focuses on the divine intention rather than causal joints, much as the primary-secondary
causation model discussed above focuses on the divine intention with regard to events
within one world. While some might well complain about the severity of the theodicy
problem inherent in a view that paints God as negligent of parts of creation, I think that
this hypothetical theodicy problem is precisely as difficult as the one we actually have in
this world. That is, the familiar charge is that God is negligent of certain parts and
people of our world, not acting when acting would seem to ease pain, prevent cruelty,
and increase justice and love, and educate human beings in much needed ways.
43 David Z. Albert gives a clear description of the many-minds view in Quantum Mechanics
and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1992). This view offers significant advan-
tages over the ordinary many-worlds interpretation and the price paid is modest (in the
context of the alternatives): accepting an unanticipated role for consciousness. A more
general framework for understanding this version of the many-minds approach is the
consistent histories approach, on which see Chris Clarke, “The Histories Interpretation of
Quantum Theory and the Problem of Human/Divine Action,” in Quantum Mechanics.
44 OPTION #6 deserves serious consideration in the context of the many-minds interpreta-
tion in which measurement events do not describe ontological splits but rather the
synchronizing of conscious observers and events within an unimaginably complex
superposition of states. All possible quantum “worlds” thus coexist within a single
superposition and consciousness just happens to be the sort of thing that selects out an
intelligible world for observation. On this interpretation, special divine action might be
a kind of mind-to-mind influence in which God triggers subtle shifts in our conscious-
ness so that we see a slightly different kaleidoscopic cross-section of the vast superposi-
tion that is reality. It may even be possible for observers within the world to modify their
own consciousness in such a way as to skip to other world-synchronizations. This view
also allows for the possibility that people capable of observing one another could yet see
other features of the world differently, which possibility could serve as a speculative
framework for articulating the distinction between conventional and ultimate reality
that certain Buddhists and Hindus deploy to describe enlightenment and stages along
the way to that ultimate state of liberation. If forced to choose among the various options
for QSDA, I would choose this one, not because of its interpretation of the quantum
formalism but because of the elegant way its rendering of SDA corresponds to long-held
beliefs in the world’s great spiritual wisdom traditions.
45 I conjecture that it is partly because Murphy does not like these consequences of a
descriptive approach to the laws of nature that she speculates about OPTION #4, which
ties her theory of SDA decisively to the quantum realm in a way that a descriptive
approach to the laws of nature requires, thereby gaining valuable theoretical intelligibility.
46 I think it is partly because of this difficulty that both Ellis and Tracy entertain divine
action only in some providentially relevant events, rather than in all events. This gives
the strongest and least contrived answer to the theological complaint that we cannot
have human beings constraining divine freedom to act based solely on whether scien-
tists happen to be gathering quantum statistics.
47 See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, chapters 5–6. Also, see his “Does God
Cheat at Dice? Divine Action and Quantum Possibilities,” Zygon 35:3.
48 See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 127–148, which is the first part of
chapter 6, see also matching parts in “Does God Cheat at Dice?” Zygon 35:3.
49 Specifically, Saunders’ treatment of divine initiation of quantum measurement events
does not discuss the possibility that there may be some stochastic element involved,
even outside the continuous spontaneous localization or decoherence theories, which is
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72 Theology and Science
the key to making OPTION #1 feasible. He alludes to OPTION #4 in passing but does
not analyze it fully and so misses its potential for an incompatibilist account of QSDA;
see Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 162. In addition, OPTION #5 does not
appear in his discussion of the many-worlds approach (159–62), though he does note
correctly that compatibilist approaches (of which OPTION #5 could be one if suitably
interpreted) have some room to breathe in the many-worlds view. Moreover, he does
not consider the strange and possibly indeterministic spaces between worlds that result
from quantum splitting in the many-minds approach, or the potential for a mind-to-
mind causation approach, both of which come into play in OPTION #6.
50 See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 110–126, which is the last part of
chapter 5.
51 See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, especially 149–156, but continuing
through to the end of chapter 6, and matching parts in the Zygon article cited above.
52 Russell alludes to it in some places while rejecting it more clearly in others; see below for
the specific details of DAP proposals for QSDA.
53 See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 155.
54 See especially Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, chapter 3, on “The Laws of
Nature and Miracles.” Unfortunately, there is no clear discussion of the scope of
stochastic laws of nature governing quantum measurement events (do they apply to
ensembles only? to individual events?) in the otherwise helpful treatment of laws of
nature in that chapter, yet this distinction seems to be operating silently in the critiques
of chapter 6. It is similarly unfortunate that the reasons for rejecting the strong-
ontological interpretations are not presented clearly in existing DAP publications.
However, there is no mystery about this: Ellis, Murphy, Russell, and Tracy are right to
believe that the strong-ontological interpretation of stochastic laws instantly destroys
their proposals and they are justified in spending their energy arguing for the feasibility
of their own views of the laws of nature and SDA.
55 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Macmillan, 1929, 1933). The
argument about freedom and determinism is in the Transcendental Dialectic, Book II,
Chapter II, Section 9.
56 On this, see especially Stoeger’s elegant discussion in “Describing God’s Action in the
World in Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality,” in Chaos and Complexity.
57 We might think that Polkinghorne’s view counts as a fifth proposal for QSDA. After all,
consistency demands that Polkinghorne, rather than arguing against QSDA, should
make the same hypothetical proposal in relation to epistemological limits in quantum
mechanics that he makes in relation to the epistemological limits of chaos theory,
namely, that the relevant laws of nature are downward emergent approximations to a
suppler, subtler physical reality within which God acts freely. He approaches this
toward the end of his essay, “Physical Process, Quantum Events, and Divine Agency”
(Quantum Mechanics 188–190) but, even in the context of a magnanimous review of the
debate over QSDA, he implies that beginning speculation about SDA from chaos theory
and starting from quantum mechanics are competing approaches. I have not yet
grasped how this can be so, even if we accept the problematic causal joint proposal of
active information changing complex systems through zero-energy alterations of
particle trajectories on chaotic attractors. In fact, I would think that Polkinghorne’s
approach would apply to every domain of science and every level of reality and every
physical law.
58 At one point Russell clearly rejects the idea “that God . . . makes measurements on a
given system” (Quantum Mechanics 296). Yet at the beginning of the same essay, he
writes, “[I]f quantum mechanics is interpreted philosophically in terms of ontological
indeterminism . . . , one can construct a bottom-up, noninterventionist, objective
approach to mediated direct divine action in which God’s indirect acts of general and
special providence at the macroscopic level arise in part, at least, from God’s objective
direct action at the quantum level both in sustaining the time-development of
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The Divine Action Project 73
elementary processes as governed by the Schrödinger equation and in acting with
nature to bring about irreversible interactions referred to as ‘quantum events’”
(Quantum Mechanics 293). Here and in earlier writings, Russell appears at least to
entertain the possibility that God could initiate quantum measurement events. I argued
above that this possibility is not as problematic as he seems to conclude.
59 In informal discussions surrounding the DAP, but not I think in writing, Murphy has
experimented with the idea that God may select outcomes of measurement events in the
sense of OPTION #4. She intends this as a thought experiment aimed at resolving a
difficulty in the many-worlds interpretation of the quantum mechanics formalism, at
the same time as finding in quantum mechanics an ingenious source of support for the
idea of special divine action of the pervasive “all events” sort. She points out that a few
other people have explored this idea in conversation. While most views asserting
universal intentional divine action usually remain vague on the question of the causal
joint of action, Murphy’s thought experiment is quite specific and especially interesting
because of that. In particular, specifying a causal joint using OPTION #4 offers a way for
Murphy to limit God’s action to the quantum level that is less arbitrary than OPTION #3
alone. After all, her descriptive approach to laws of nature is indifferent to the locus in
nature of God’s action, apart from independent specification of a quantum-level causal
joint. Alternatively, of course, Murphy might prefer to capitalize on the compatibilist
tendencies of a descriptive approach to laws of nature. These same considerations apply
to Russell’s approach.
60 Though this is not my theological territory, recalling the need for an interpreter to
maintain credibility, I should state my preferences among these and related options for
SDA. To that end, consider the following chain of counterfactuals. If hypothetically
forced to accept that God is a personal being who can form intentions and act on them,
then I strongly prefer a theory of SDA that affirms miraculous abrogation or suspension
of natural laws, owing to its protection of the divine freedom against human pretensions
to understand and control it. If further forced to accept the goal of noninterventionism,
then I prefer a compatibilist approach for the same reasons. If still further compelled to
select from the options available to me within the sphere of objective, incompatibilist,
non-interventionist theories, then I would elect the many-minds interpretation of the
quantum formalism and OPTION #6 as the mode of divine action. This is because of the
flexibility it offers in talking about divine action and because of its consonance both with
south Asian and east Asian interpretations of the religious quest for enlightenment and
liberation, and with west Asian interpretations of sanctification and divinization.
61 In explaining his hypothesis that God acts in indeterminacies at the quantum level,
Tracy goes so far as to declare that, “I am not saying that God acts only through the gaps
in the causal order of nature”; see “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” in
Chaos and Complexity (319; italics in original). In fact, DAP participants usually took an
open-ended approach to theorizing about SDA, focusing more on establishing the
feasibility of their favored proposal rather than arguing that their view is the only
possible one. Tracy was particularly concerned to develop what he calls a “tool box” of
options for understanding SDA, within which he thinks his theory of QSDA has a
rightful place, along with compatibilist possibilities and even miracles.
62 See Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Scrödinger’s Cat,”
in Chaos and Complexity, especially 340–342, where she writes the line, “To put it crudely,
God is the hidden variable” (342).
63 See Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” in Chaos and Complexity.
Tracy discusses the issue of the scope of God’s action at the quantum level on 320–322.
64 Though Russell’s contribution to Evolutionary and Molecular Biology focuses on
quantum-level special divine action in genetic mutations, at some places he seems to
affirm comprehensive divine action. The extreme example is when Russell writes, “I
think that indeterminacies in quantum behavior arise in a much more pervasive way
that the term ‘measurement’ suggests. Instead, they arise constantly, everywhere and at
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74 Theology and Science
all times, in every part of the universe. If so, this claim can increase the theological
intelligibility of our faith in general providence of the Triune God who is everywhere and
at all times at work in and through all of nature” (Evolutionary and Molecular Biology 214).
Unfortunately, Russell does not elaborate on this suggestion, which seems to expand the
notion of quantum event considerably. In Russell’s contribution to Quantum Mechanics,
he clearly sides with Murphy’s proposal that God acts in all quantum events and
somehow can convey special meaning through some of these events. See “Divine Action
and Quantum Mechanics,” in Quantum Mechanics, especially 316–317. Of course,
Russell’s proposal also involves God contracting the sphere of special action in the
presence of conscious creatures, which we will discuss below.
65 DAP publications typically show great care in the use of the word “event.” In the
following discussion, I use the term “event” in multiple ways. In some cases, the
reference is to quantum measurement events, in others to events in the sense of process
metaphysics, which are not related to quantum measurement events. In still other cases,
I do not specify a metaphysical framework for stabilizing the concept. This usage is
merely for the sake of convenience and the context makes clear which sense of “event”
is meant.
66 See Karl Heim, The Transformation of the Scientific World (London: SCM Press, 1953).
67 See William G. Pollard, Chance and Providence: God’s Action in a World Governed by
Scientific Law (London: Faber and Faber, 1958).
68 See Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order,” in Chaos and Complexity. There
Murphy makes the necessary relation between God and quantum events clear when she
writes, “My proposal is that God’s governance at the quantum level consists in acti-
vating or actualizing one or another of the quantum entity’s innate powers at particular
instants, and that these events are not possible without God’s action” (342). Russell
clearly rejects the omnideterminism of Pollard; see “Special Providence and Genetic
Mutation: a New Defense of Theistic Evolution,” in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology,
where Russell writes, “Though I strongly support Pollard’s advance over Heim’s formu-
lation of the thesis, I do not support their advocacy of divine determinism” (209).
69 See Murphy, Chaos and Complexity 342. Murphy’s view is strongly reminiscent of
Jonathan Edwards’ view of God’s providence—God determines the world but beauti-
fully, respectfully, and gloriously so. See Murphy, The Freedom of the Will (Morgan,
Pennsylvania: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 2003).
70 In the Evolutionary and Molecular Biology essay, Russell usually refers to biological evolu-
tion rather than cosmic history. For example, when he expresses the contraction of
divine activity in relation to biological evolution, he writes as follows, “We may think of
God as acting in all quantum events in the course of biological evolution until the
emergence of organisms capable of even primitive levels of consciousness. Form then
on, . . . God may abstain from acting in those quantum events underlying bodily dispo-
sitions, thereby allowing the developing levels of consciousness to act out their inten-
tions somatically” (215). I think divine action on a cosmic, indeed universal, scale is
implied, however, and not just in biological evolution. This point is clarified in Quantum
Mechanics.
71 Russell is sharply aware of the questions his view invites about God’s goodness and
believes that a Trinitarian theology of creation, redemption, and consummation is neces-
sary finally to address them.
72 See George F. R. Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action,” in Chaos and
Complexity, especially 379–382. Ellis’s later essays appear to broaden the scope of divine
action, though the emphasis remains on intermittent rather than universal action with a
focus on human beings; see Ellis, “Quantum Theory and the Macroscopic World,” in
Quantum Mechanics.
73 Russell’s frank statement of this point is admirable: “I believe the problem of theodicy is
stunningly exacerbated by all the proposals, including my own” (Evolutionary and
Molecular Biology 216).
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The Divine Action Project 75
74 See Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order,” in Chaos and Complexity; and Russell,
“Special Providence and Genetic Mutation: a New Defense of Theistic Evolution,” in
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology.
75 See Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction,” in
Chaos and Complexity.
76 See Tracy, “Evolution, Divine Action, and the Problem of Evil,” in Evolutionary and
Molecular Biology.
77 See Moltmann, “Reflections on Chaos and God’s Interaction with the World from a
Trinitarian Perspective,” in Chaos and Complexity; Russell, “Divine Action and Quantum
Mechanics,” in Quantum Mechanics; and Edwards, “The Discovery of Chaos and the
Retrieval of the Trinity,” in Chaos and Complexity.
78 I am deeply indebted to the many members of the DAP, and especially to the core group
of philosophers and theologians, for my understanding of the issues surrounding the
concept of SDA. Their influence suffuses this survey. Any mistakes of logic or interpre-
tation are exclusively my responsibility.
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